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1It is not a new discovery that economics play a large
role in our everyday lives—and an ever larger role in
the sphere of culture and the arts. The influence of
economic and business thinking presents a signifi-
cant challenge to the heritage conservation field. We
are confronted with a daunting array of economic
difficulties and obstacles—as well as new worlds of
opportunity.
Increasingly we find economic considerations
taking precedence over cultural, social, political, and
aesthetic values when it comes to making decisions
about what heritage is to be conserved. Because this
trend is occurring the world over with regard to all
types of material heritage, and because our deci-
sions about what and how to conserve are strongly
influenced by economic considerations, the Getty
C o n s e rvation Institute (GCI) is pursuing the
Economics of Heritage Conservation as an area of
research.
This report conveys the results of GCI’s initial
meeting on this research topic and highlights some
specific areas that will receive further consideration
and research. An interdisciplinary and international
group of scholars and professionals convened for
three days in December 1998 to discuss, in broad
terms, the potential for collaboration and conflict
when economic and cultural values are brought
together. We were successful in identifying specific
areas of agreement and disagreement. These will
form the basis of an ongoing collaboration among
economists, scholars of culture, and conservation
professionals as we continue our work on this topic.
The aim of our Economics project and other
c o n s e rvation re s e a rch activities is the cultivation of
c re a t ive, holistic, mu l t i d i s c i p l i n a ry, and even specula-
t ive thinking about the fu t u re of c o n s e rvation and its
role in society. This type of re s e a rch is essential if c u l-
t u ral heritage and its conservation are to play a pro-
d u c t ive role in the society of the next millennium.
What is at stake when we speak of the role of
heritage in society? As this report goes to print, a
dreadful, destructive scenario continues to unfold in
southeast Europe. This civil, military, political con-
flict centers on the strong feelings and social bonds
that are rooted in heritage—in issues of land and cul-
ture. These events should be an additional caution to
those of us concerned with the fate of heritage. We
conserve, interpret, manage, and invest in heritage
at our peril if we don’t understand the roles it plays
in society—for better and for worse—as a lightning
rod for cohesion and conflict.
This report consists of the following sections: an
essay describing the background, goals, discussions,
and conclusions of the December 1998, meeting
(accompanied by quotes, in the right-hand column,
excerpted from meeting transcripts); the transcript
of a public panel discussion held at the J. Paul Getty
Museum as part of the meeting; the text of the back-
ground research paper prepared in advance of the
meeting; and suggestions for further reading. 
Thanks go to Professor Arjo Klamer and Peter-
Wim Zuidhof for their diligent work in creating the
background paper, and for their collaboration in
designing and facilitating the meeting. Thanks are
also extended to our colleagues from around the
world as well as those from the Getty who took part
in the December meeting.
I encourage you to join with us in this research,
make these questions your own, and contact us with
your thoughts and ideas on these topics.
Marta de la Torre
April 1999
Preface
2From December 8 through 11, 1998, the Getty
Conservation Institute gathered a group of scholars
and practitioners for a conference investigating eco-
nomic issues relating to the conservation of heritage
objects, collections, buildings, and sites. The partici-
pants—drawn from disciplines ranging from eco-
nomics to anthropology to conserva t i o n1— d i s-
cussed and debated the contributions that economic
discourse and analysis can make to the work of con-
servation. In particular, they sought to understand
the economic influences on conservation decisions
and to identify concepts and approaches for evaluat-
ing both the economic and the cultural values of
heritage. 
This meeting, part of a larger inquiry into the
economics of conservation, was designed to fill a
specific absence in the existing body of work on eco-
nomics and conservation: the need to investigate the
concepts that have traditionally separated economic
and cultural conservation discourses and to investi-
gate concepts for joining them. This approach con-
t rasts with the thrust of much contempora ry
research on the economics of conservation, which
asks how to measure heritage in terms of price, with-
out considering why. Most such work is aimed at
re fining economic tools for measuring heritage
value, without consideration for the assumptions
that underlie them and that often undermine the rel-
evance of heritage conservation to society. The gath-
ering yielded a number of concrete insights, several
s p e c i fic directions for fu rther re s e a rch, and a
remarkable discussion among the many disciplines
represented at the table.
At the heart of the meeting was the fundamen-
tal quandary that methods of economic valuation
i n c re a s i n gly dominate society’s handling of t h e
value of heritage, while the same methods are
unable to account for some of the most salient val-
ues and virtues of h e r i t a g e — n a m e ly, historical
meaning, symbolic and spiritual values, political
functions, aesthetic qualities, and the capacity of
heritage to help communities negotiate and form
their identity. In short, heritage cannot be valued
simply in terms of price.
The participants worked to bridge this gap, dis-
cussing ways to improve the ability of economic
thinking to understand, inform, and support conser-
vation. A great deal of energy was devoted to find-
ing intellectual common ground among different
disciplines and values—concepts and models that
connect economic thinking with the concerns of
heritage and conservation advocates—and by all
accounts, the meeting yielded significant progress.
The research coming out of this meeting, undertak-
en by the GCI, its collaborators, and individual
scholars, will lead toward a unifying approach to the
values of heritage and to a means of accounting for
the multiplicity of values that are such a fundamen-
tal part of the conservation process.
Conclusions of the Meeting
The following points summarize the main conclu-
sions reached during the meeting.
The Nature of Heritage
Prefacing the discussions of economics, we observed
two aspects of cultural heritage that strongly shaped
the discussions. First, material heritage is valued in a
number of different, sometimes conflicting ways.
The variety of values ascribed to any particular her-
itage object—economic value, aesthetic value, cul-
tural value, political value, educational value2—is
matched by the variety of stakeholders participating
in the heritage conservation process. Balancing these
values is one of the most difficult challenges in mak-
ing conservation decisions that satisfy the needs of
many stakeholders. Second, “heritage” is an essen-
Economics and Heritage Conservation: 
Concepts, Values, and Agendas for Research 
Randall Mason
3tially collective and public notion. Though heritage
is certainly valued by individuals, its raison d’être is,
by definition, to sustain a sphere of public interest
and public good. This insight is a common thread
running through all the types of heritage values
noted above; the meeting discussions demonstrated
many times over that it is key to understanding con-
servation decisions in either economic or cultural
terms.
The Value of Economic Thinking 
Economic thinking and concepts make indispens-
able contributions to our understanding of conser-
vation’s role in society. As a social science, econom-
ics sheds light on individual behavior as well as on
the character of society, and thus shares a great deal
with anthropology, art history, and other disciplines
whose work has traditionally had a close relation to
the field of conservation.
Measuring Heritage in Te rms of Price
Traditional economic models fail in important ways
to analyze heritage and conservation; these models
are designed to express all values in terms of prices,
which are established in markets. However, all her-
itage values cannot be put into a single, traditional
economic framework, nor can they all be measured
in monetary terms. Much creative work has been
u n d e rtaken to strengthen economic science.
Po t e n t i a l ly, other, mu l t i d i s c i p l i n a ry fra m ewo r ks,
concepts, and analytical tools can be devised to
account for the full range of values.
Bridging Economic and Cultural Appro a c h e s
Analytical models from cultural fields (which under-
pin conservation practice) offer a variety of ways to
conceptualize the value of heritage—many of which
are quite unrelated to economic discourse and val-
ues. However, this needn’t be the case. Greater
engagement between cultural and economic con-
cerns, as well as mutual understanding, is essential
for enabling conservation to play a greater role in
civil society.
The Growing Influence of Markets
Market economics holds sway in more and more
spheres of contemporary society and is a factor of
Cultures are always in flux, ever 
changing, politically charged, negotiated,
situated. Economics can try to fix, study,
and analyze these dynamics, but can any
analysis get it all? 
—Setha Low
How well does economic analysis account
for the range and variety and complexity
of values that culturalists see in heritage
conservation? . . . Economics, for many 
different reasons, is one of the increasingly
dominant ways that heritage and conser-
vation are valued.
—Randall Mason
In economics, the outcome is valued over
the process. Theoretically, we recognize
that conservation is a process, but we have
not really come to grips with how we
value the process versus how we value the
outcome. 
—Erica Avrami
4growing   prominence  in  conservation  policies  and
decisions. This development goes hand in hand with
the globalization of society. A balance of different
valuing systems, discourses, and modes of analy-
sis—economic and cultural—is needed to address
this perceived policy shift in the larger society.
C o n s e rvation as a Pro c e s s
The social processes behind conservation decisions
have to be understood better in order to balance and
reach decisions about the multiple values of her-
itage. The consensus at the meeting was that many
aspects of conservation are best modeled as a con-
tinuing and contingent process. This insight follows
from a vast body of research undertaken in the
humanities and social sciences—although it wa s
observed that a process-centered model contrasts
with the conservation field’s traditional focus on
products and outcomes.
Conceptual Common Gro u n d
Meeting participants agreed on several concepts,
models, and other topics that have potential for
bridging economic and cultural approaches to valu-
ing heritage, informing conservation practice, and
shaping decisions. Looking to the future, each of
these would be a worthy subject for collaborative,
multidisciplinary research:
• the  diffe rence  between  economic  and  cultur-
al values—this subject was a focus of rewarding
conceptual discussion throughout the meeting,
and it was felt that this basic theme should
remain on the table as the GCI’s research on eco-
nomics is continued; there is much to be gained
by continuing to debate these two distinct ways
of valuing heritage and discussing how they con-
flict and how they might overlap;
• sustainability, and other concepts rooted in envi-
ronmental conservation, which purp o s e ly
bridge economic activities and social issues and
lead to new policies and social norms;
• the concept of cultural capital, as an extension of
o f the work on social capital and natural cap i t a l
u n d e rtaken in other fi e l d s, which has had signifi -
cant impact on social and environmental policy ;
• d e c i s i o n - m a king processes, stru c t u re s, and insti-
t u t i o n s, which play a strong role in shaping con-
s e rvation outcomes and are an abiding re s e a rc h
i n t e rest in both economic and cultural fi e l d s ;
• the role of the third sphere3 (which includes
nonp r o fit orga n i z a t i o n s,  civic  associations,  vo l-
u ntarism, and so on) as an arena of social and
economic exchange distinct from the market
sphere and the government sphere, and essential
to civil society.
Background
VALUING THE ECONOMICS OF HERITA G E
C O N S E RVAT I O N
Can economic analysis account for the richness of
cultural values ascribed to heritage? If so, how?
These are the fundamental questions addressed at
this meeting. 
Throughout contemporary society, the impor-
tance of economic forces is on the rise—the reality
of globalization and the increasing dominance of
market-based approaches to social concerns are sure
signs that the conservation field needs to engage in
serious research regarding economics.
Economic factors shape the possibilities of con-
servation practice in fundamental ways, by influenc-
ing decisions, shaping policy, encouraging or dis-
couraging the use of heritage, enabling conserva-
tion work through financing, giving incentives to
stewardship, and so on. Pricing, trading, financing,
taxing, and subsidizing occupy a sphere of s o c i a l
activity too rarely thought to be of concern to the
conservation field; even so, the concepts, language,
tools, and practices of economists and the operation
of economic institutions often set the stage for con-
servation practice. 
The investigation of economic perspectives on
cultural heritage and of the economic values tied up
in conservation practice are therefore a priority in
the GCI’s efforts to strengthen conservation practice
and advance the understanding of conservation’s
role in contemporary society. It is essential, in the
G C I ’s view, that the heritage conservation fi e l d
develop a stronger command of economic logic, dis-
course, and tools in order to be more effective in
5applying its expertise. This meeting was a deliberate
step toward this goal, an attempt to establish dia-
logue and a shared sense of purpose among the eco-
nomic and cultural fields.
Moreover, the conservation field has a great deal
of knowledge to convey to the field of cultural eco-
nomics as it engages heritage conservation. The
range, complexity, and multivalent nature of the val-
ues that underlie heritage and the practice of con-
servation are a particular concern. Economic dis-
course must be reworked and reimagined to account
for these kinds of value—aesthetic, symbolic, his-
toric—and to go beyond different methods of pric-
ing, or recognition of the public-good character of
heritage objects and places.
C O N S E RVATION RESEARCH PROGRAM
The GCI’s conservation research program explores
the role of social forces (economic, cultural, politi-
cal) on the practice of conservation. Through a pro-
gram of integrated research activities—both con-
ceptual and empirical—the GCI and its collaborators
investigate issues related to the conservation field’s
function in civil society. This re s e a rch initiative
includes conferences and symposia, commissioned
research papers, original research, and dissemina-
tion of research results to the conservation field and
its allied disciplines.
The Economics of Heritage Conserva t i o n
inquiry grew out of an investigation of the values
and benefits of heritage conservation, specifically
the role of social values and valuing processes in
conservation. In identifying the wide range of values
that are applied to heritage and that shape conserva-
tion practices and decisions, it became clear that one
of society’s most important means of valuing—eco-
nomics—warranted a focused effort on its own. In
the course of isolating economic issues and studying
them intensively, the ultimate goal has remained the
integration of the Economics inquiry into the area
of values research.
Two important points from the early phases of
GCI research should be briefly relayed here, as they
helped form the questions driving this Economics
meeting: First, valuing processes underpin conserva-
tion and should even be seen as part of the conserva-
One purpose of this meeting has been to
give economists new input for revising
their models. We hope that you, econo-
mists, will give us input into our own 
models in anthropology, sociology, and art
history, in order to broaden our own
analysis.
—Lourdes Arizpe
If we are unable to articulate the values of
heritage in the broadest sense—economic
as well as cultural—the movement begins
to crumble at the center.
—Daniel Bluestone
6tion process. Decisions of w h a t to conserve and h o w
to conserve are made in the context of m a ny diffe r-
ent valuing systems, not just those of c o n s e rva t o rs. It
is one of the basic contentions of this re s e a rch that
heritage is routinely valued in a number of d i s t i n c t
ways—on economic, aesthetic, re l i gi o u s, political,
c u l t u ral, and other gr o u n d s. Second, the va l u i n g
process consists of t wo distinct but intertwined part s :
valuation (the assessment of existing value) and va l-
orization (the addition of value). These  are  essential
p a rts  of the conservation process, and the distinction
b e t ween them helps explain why economic va l u e s
( which, in broad brush, are the result of va l u a t i o n )
a re often seen as quite separate from cultural va l u e s
( which result more from the process of va l o r i z a t i o n ) .
THE ECONOMICS INQUIRY
The formative questions for the Economics meeting
were first voiced at a GCI meeting on the values and
b e n e fits of heritage held in Ja nu a ry 1998.
Participants in that gathering recognized that eco-
nomic values were not given wide consideration in
conservation circles (and in studies of culture more
generally), as they were seen to always “crowd out”
and trump the cultural values that have traditionally
been at the heart of conservation work. The inclu-
sion of an economist—Prof. Arjo Klamer of
E ra s mus Unive rs i t y, Ro t t e rdam—in the Ja nu a ry
meeting led to a more balanced insight: economic
values are dominant in the society at large and have
a well-formed canon of methods and tools to sup-
port them. If the conservation field wants to have
greater influence in society, it must find ways of
engaging (not simply resisting) the power and influ-
ence of economists’ work and business thinking;
likewise, economists dealing with culture, heritage,
and the arts must be willing to examine the limits of
traditional economic thinking. How can economic
analysis be strengthened by the insights of “cultural”
fields (such as anthropology, sociology, and art his-
tory) and of the conservation field itself? This ques-
tion set the foundation for our Economics meeting. 
To address these important questions for the
conservation field and to build on the growing body
of work in cultural economics, the GCI began orga-
nizing a second meeting in consultation with Klamer
and other colleagues in the conservation, cultural,
and economics fields.
BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CONSERVAT I O N
In preparation for the meeting, GCI staff worked
with Klamer and his colleagues at Era s mu s
University to develop a background research paper
and a collection of previously published articles to
serve as a briefing package for the meeting. Klamer’s
background paper clearly set out the assumptions
and concepts underpinning the economists’ tradi-
tional individual- and market-centered approach to
the question of values. One of the paper’s key points
is  the  ineluctable  conclusion  that  markets  “fail”
when dealing with heritage conservation—that is,
markets alone fail to provide for investment in her-
itage—and this phenomenon is due to the public-
good character of cultural heritage objects. In the
absence of workable markets, other arrangements
must be found to finance conservation and other
heritage investments, and this responsibility has tra-
ditionally fallen to governments.
The background paper made a distinction
between two basic kinds of valuing processes and
two corresponding ways of thinking about value:
economic and  cultural.  Each  of these  modes  of
thinking is advocated by a corresponding group—
economists and “culturalists,” including conserva-
tors, art historians, anthropologists, and other social
scientists. These two camps represent very different
approaches to understanding the interplay of values
and conservation. In devising the culturalist neolo-
gism, Klamer imposed a useful set of categories on
the participants in the meeting. While everyone
rejected the label culturalist, it challenged partici-
pants to match the rigor and the clear frameworks
with which economists approach heritage conserva-
tion.  The  economist/culturalist  distinction  forced
the diverse group of non-economists to search for
and articulate the principles, assumptions, and meth-
ods that guide the formation and analysis of the cul-
tural values of heritage. Distinguishing between
these two approaches also paved the way for the sub-
sequent meeting sessions devoted to bridging these
two worldviews.
7Klamer also reviewed the current work of cul-
tural economists, including the analytical tools that
are currently being used to measure the values of
cultural heritage in order to make investment and
p o l i cy decisions rega rding conservation. Th e s e
include contingent valuation methods, willingness-
to-pay studies, impact studies, and more. Many of
these methods are borrowed from the field of envi-
ronmental economics.
In the second part of the briefing paper, Klamer
proposes a specific framework for explaining how
conservation is financed when markets fail. This
“three spheres” model explains and tracks the uni-
ve rse of d i ffe rent financial arra n g e m e n t s. Th e
model outlines three distinct (and complementary)
s p h e res of economic activ i t y — m a r k e t s, gove rn-
ments, and the third sphere of nonprofit organiza-
tions—and the types of exchanges, institutions, and
ways of decision making that characterize each.
Klamer emphasizes the creative possibilities inher-
ent in the notion of gift exchanges (which are char-
acteristic of the third sphere), and notes the capacity
of gifts to account for economic and cultural values.
F u rt h e r, the model synthesizes and extends the
economists’ insight into the ways heritage is val-
ued—not only by individuals but by commu n i t i e s,
g ove rn m e n t s, and other collective institutions.
Given the essentially collective nature of heritage—
it is an expression of group identity, not entirely
reducible to individual consumer choice—this is an
important turn for economic thinking on heritage.
DESIGNING THIS MEETING
The role of economics in conservation is often nar-
rowly conceived to mean measuring the economic
impact of tourism, pricing movable heritage in art
markets, and identifying means of financing conser-
vation. These would more accurately be called the
business concerns of conservation. Yet economic
issues of conservation run much deeper and require
a good deal of conceptual clarification.
This meeting, the first in a deeper research
inquiry, purposely refrained from the question of
how to measure and price the noneconomic values
o f heritage. Questions about re fining analy t i c a l
methods are an abiding interest within the main-
If there are multiple values, then there is a
problem of trade-offs among those values.
And then it begins sounding an awful lot
like a problem of economics. 
—J. Mark Schuster
What economists want to insist on is that
scarcity matters. If scarcity matters, choice
matters. 
—Arjo Klamer
You have a problem if you apply these
assumptions and ideas to cultures that do
not share this concept of scarcity. Western
society has been very influenced by this
concept of scarcity, but there are many
others that have not.
—Marta de la Torre
The culturalist side, which lumps together
very different disciplines, is really very
fragmented in its methodologies and in its
basic concepts for analyzing cultural 
heritage. 
—Lourdes Arizpe
8stream economics discipline, but they often presume
(mistakenly) that (1) this kind of measurement has a
negligible effect on non-economic (cultural) values,
and (2) that the information gained will necessarily
lead to better decisions and outcomes.
This meeting was based on a different presump-
tion: that much can be gained by discussing the con-
ceptual issues and assumptions that underpin her-
itage valuing. Cultural economists should be
encouraged in their ongoing work to extend into the
area of non-economic values without assuming the
need to quantify them—or, rather, without assum-
ing the value of doing so. It became apparent in our
meeting that further research on such topics as cul-
tural capital, sustainability, the role of the third (non-
profit) sphere, decision-making processes, and cul-
tural indicators will provide a rich fund of ideas on
which conservation professionals and policy makers
can draw as alternatives to measuring the value of
heritage simply in terms of price.
Procedurally, the meeting’s starting point was
the establishment of a shared appreciation for the
insights of cultural economics, in which the short-
comings of t raditional economic discourse and
analysis are well recognized. Through a series of dis-
cussions we sought ways to: 
• extend the work of c u l t u ral economics, so that
it is better able to model the cultural values of
heritage; 
• ex p l o re the ways in which economic values and
discourse shape conservation practices and deci-
sions; and 
• imagine   concepts   that   would   be   common
ground  for  economic  and  cultural  analysis  of
heritage values.
Our goals included the ve ry specific item of fo rmu-
lating a re s e a rch agenda for the GCI, its collabora-
t o rs, and other organizations to carry fo r wa rd with
s p e c i fic lines of i n q u i ry. Sustained over the course of
t h ree day s, the vigor and open-mindedness of the dis-
cussions was re m a r ka ble. The participants success-
fu l ly worked across disciplinary lines to identify con-
c e p t s, ideas, models, and cases through which the dif-
fe rent values can be brought into common under-
standing without losing their essential qualities.
Goals
The meeting discussions took their cue from a clear
set of goals that identified the conceptual insights to
arise from the meeting and also identified ways to
apply the insights in future research and dissemina-
tion. These five goals were formulated by GCI staff
in concert with Klamer and presented at the outset
of the meeting: 
• U n d e rstand how conservation decisions (wh a t
gets conserved and how) are shaped by different
ways of valuing heritage.
• Find the common ground shared by economist
and  culturalist  ways  of valuing  and  valorizing
heritage. 
• U n d e rstand the contributions and limits of e c o -
nomic  discourse  as  it  relates  to  conservation.
• E s t a blish what we need to know about the eco-
nomics of conservation and formulate a strategy
for getting there.
• Take advantage of this opportunity to work cre-
atively across disciplines.
Outcomes
Stemming directly from the five goals, the discus-
sions—among the plenary group and in smaller,
breakout groups—were aimed at achieving the fol-
l owing four outcomes. The statement of e a c h
intended outcome is followed by a summary of
what was discussed in the meeting:
OUTCOME 1: An articulation of the contribu-
tions economic discourse can make to heritage
conservation, as well as an understanding of
the limits of economic discourse.
F i rst, participants from all disciplines re c og n i zed that
the contributions of economic science to heritage
c o n s e rvation are significant but indeed limited. Many
such contributions we re outlined in Klamer’s back-
ground paper and we re re i n fo rced or extended by the
other economists participating in the meeting. 
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heritage values by clarifying some basic insights about
i n d ividual behav i o r, economic institutions, politics,
and the essential economic functions of s o c i e t y :
• Scarcity  and  competition: Resources  are  scarce 
(or ra t h e r, limited), and competition for scarc e
resources is a driving force in society.
• M a r k e t s : Markets are a pre fe rred way of a l l o c a t -
ing many kinds of resources and are premised on
the sovereignty of individuals. Market dynamics
guide  decision  making  about  many  aspects  of
society, including heritage conservation (as in the
case,  for  example,  of a  gove rnment  agency
deciding to allocate conservation funds to proj-
ects  that  will  generate  the  most  tourism  rev-
enue). 
• P u blic go o d s : In certain cases, re s o u rces cannot
be allocated effe c t ive ly through market mecha-
nisms (examples include clean air, as well as her-
itage);  the  overall  value  of such  goods  is  not
reflected by the prices individuals are willing to
pay in the market. Such “public goods” show the
limitations of markets and the necessity for types
o f economic  exchange  and  economic  institu-
tions  in  addition  to  markets  (i.e., government
grants or voluntary donations).
• Market failure: Markets fail to provide for certain
p u blic goods; this basic economic phenomenon
(market failure) leads to collective action for the
p r ovision of “heritage goods”—most often the
c o l l e c t ive  action  is  taken  by  a  gove rn m e n t a l
b o d y. Economists re c og n i ze that market fa i l u re
is the rule, not the exception, in the case of c u l -
tural  heritage,  and  their  search  for  analytical
tools and approaches takes off from this insight.
• The  roles  of non-market  institutions: Given  that
markets  fail  to  provide  for  cultural  heritage,
economists  search  for  other  types  of transac-
tions, analytical tools, institutional mechanisms,
and decision-making processes to take care of
the  provisioning  of heritage  goods  in  society.
These effo rts often focus on ways of s i mu l a t i n g
or extending market principles into areas where
markets tra d i t i o n a l ly fail (contingent va l u a t i o n
or  cost-benefit  analyses  are  examples  of this);
The more we talk about individuals, the
farther away we get from issues that are
particular to conservation.
—Erica Avrami
You have to take into account that compe-
tition works only in a context where
cooperation is made possible. What the
market privileges is competition, advan-
tage, and opportunity. People tend to
think that culture gives precisely the 
contrary: cooperation, continuity, and 
solidarity.
—Lourdes Arizpe
You attack “economists,” but you actually
mean “business.” The business influence
has nothing to do with economics. My
understanding of economics is exactly the
opposite. Economists look at the nonmar-
ket values, such as option, existence,
bequest, and education values, and that’s
exactly what you on the cultural side are
concerned about.
—Bruno Frey
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another line of i n q u i ry for economists is policy
analysis,  which  focuses  on  the  ways  in  which
government steps in when markets fail.
In some instances, the contributions of economic
discourse were interpreted by participants as limits
to understanding heritage values. The most impor-
tant example of this type of limit is economics’
reliance on expressing all values in terms of price, or
money. By expressing different values in the com-
mon denominator of price, economic analyses pro-
vide a seemingly objective basis for decisions about
relative worth (of different heritage goods or invest-
ment alternatives, for example). However, it is diffi-
cult to accept that all the values of the heritage can
be expressed in terms of price. In fact, the reduction
of complex heritage values to this one easily mea-
sured unit is fundamentally opposed to the cultural-
ist/conservation view. Many cultural economists, in
fact, reject this view and turn their attention to deci-
sion making, policy formulation, understanding the
role of gifts and other non-market-priced exchanges.
Rega rding the limits of economic discours e ,
meeting participants brainstormed on a number of
social issues, cultural processes, and political goals,
which, it was felt, contribute to civil society but are
fairly invisible to traditional economic discourse.4
Clearly, some of these issues and processes are more
ideological in nature5, but the list includes issues that
often are addressed through heritage conservation
and are not well accounted for by economic models
and concepts. The following list is suggestive, not
exhaustive:
• social  justice  and  equity  in  the  provision  and
management of material heritage; 
• i n t e rg e n e rational equity, which is to say, ensur-
ing that heritage is pre s e rved for fu t u re genera -
tions; 
• p u blic accessibility of heritage objects and sites; 
• contextual meanings lent to cultural heritage by
the historical-geographical moment in which it is
situated; 
• psychological security;
• cultural confidence, or the effect of the pace and
d rastic nature of c u l t u ral change on those ex p e -
riencing it; 
• community   values   stemming   from   people’s
identification with a place;
• politics  and  power  stru g gles  invo l ved  in  the
negotiations of everyday practice and routine
decision making; 
• v i s u a l / experiential/spectacle qualities of h e r i t a g e ;
• d i ffe rences in the scale of c o n s e rvation activ i t y
(i.e., the different kinds of value seen in her
itage depending on local, national, or global 
p e rs p e ctive);
• the locus of decision making and the extent to
which it is centralized or decentralized.
Economic versus cultural values
The fundamental limit of economic thinking is that
it cannot discern important cultural and social val-
ues6 in a manner that maintains the integrity, poten-
tial,  and  rich  meaning  of these  values.  What  are
these cultural and social values? They include (but
are not limited to): 
• the  spiritual  significance  ascribed  to  religious
artifacts and places of worship; 
• aesthetic qualities that are the basis of art appre-
ciation  and  connoisseurship,  and  the  result  of
artistic creativity; 
• political functions served by totems of n a t i o n a l -
ism found and created in all parts of the wo rld; 
• the power of things to create and sustain peo-
p l e ’s  identity  as  members  of c u l t u re  gr o u p s
(whether tribes, sects, regions, classes, etc.). 
For each of these categ o r i e s, values are fo rm e d
around or through material culture — o b j e c t s, collec-
t i o n s, bu i l d i n g s, and places. And thus heritage is
u n d e rstood to serve certain, we l l - d e fined social pur-
p o s e s, while conservation perfo rms the essential social
function of s a feg u a rding and sustaining heritage.
The fundamental limit of e c o n o m i c s, then,
resides at a general level of value categories; reli-
gi o u s, aesthetic, cultural, and symbolic va l u e s
attached to heritage objects and places are unac-
11
counted for by economic analysis and any attempt to
translate these values into economic analysis is diffi-
cult. It is the consensus among culturalists that these
c u l t u ral values are degraded when they are
expressed simply in terms of price. 
It should be noted that some economists dis-
agreed that economics is limited in this regard;
instead, they argued that analytical tools can indeed
be designed to express any cultural value in terms of
price. On the whole, however, most participants—
economists and culturalists alike—agreed that there
are limits to the analytical reach of traditional eco-
nomic methods.
OUTCOME 2: An articulation of the diff e r-
ences between e c o n o m i s t and c u l t u r a l i s t
perspectives on valuing heritage, as well as
ideas for bridging those diff e re n c e s .
This outcome represents an effort to distinguish
between these two perspectives and, more impor-
tant, to find common ground between them.
Throughout the meeting, participants were asked to
name the specific concepts, theoretical concerns,
and research areas that address both economic and
cultural value and thus would hold the best promise
for future collaboration and progress. Answers to
this question would not have been forthcoming if
participants had not already voiced their mutual
willingness to work across the economist-culturalist
divide. We were gratified by the number, the speci-
ficity, and the substantial nature of the common
grounds identified by participants. The areas of
agreement are briefly described here:
Common ground
The public nature of heritage
Pa rticipants agreed that heritage goods have an
i n h e re n t ly public nature, yet economists and cultur-
alists understand the term public in signifi c a n t ly dif-
fe rent  way s.  To  economists,  public  re fe rs  to  that
which cannot be priced and provided through mar-
kets; public goods are said to be nonexc l u d a bl e
(once produced, no one can be excluded from “con-
suming” the good) and nonrival (one pers o n’s con-
sumption of the good doesn’t preclude someone
We should all remember that the econom-
ic benefits of cultural heritage evaporate
if the social, aesthetic, and other values of
cultural heritage are not respected and
are lost. 
—Neville Agnew
If I could say what’s wrong with econom-
ics. . . . First, the assumption is that all
values are translatable into a common
unit—namely dollars. So it deals with
diversity of values, but it assumes that
they can all be transferred into a common
unit. Second, it takes cultural values as
given, and ignores the extent to which the
market itself creates its own values. Third,
it ignores process completely, so issues
like justice or freedom, which are process
issues, are completely outside the sphere
of economics.
—Edward Leamer 
The language “public good” as used 
by economists tends to conflict with the
notion of the public good or public bene-
fit, which is a much broader notion—a
political process, as opposed to a com-
modity.
—David Throsby
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e l s e ’s consumption of i t ) .7 For cultura l i s t s, the term
p u blic invokes the basic political nature of all collec-
tive activities in society—in other words, the myriad
power struggles and social exchanges that attend any
e ffo rt to participate in the public realm. Publ i c
good, in culturalist parlance, re fe rs to something
quite distinct from an art i fact or building that an
economist might term a public (heritage) good. In
t e rms of c u l t u ral va l u e s, a public good is a pra c t i c e
or a social process that is beneficial to a wide seg-
ment of s o c i e t y. For example, clean air, public edu-
cation, and conservation of national heritage are
c o n s i d e red to be public goods. These diffe rent con-
ceptions of p u blic good stem from economists’
assumption that there is something intrinsic in the
s t ru c t u re of a thing that turns it into a public good,
wh e reas culturalists understand public good to be
g e n e rated contingently, by social, historical, and
c u l t u ral processes.
In the end, both sides accept the usefulness of
the other’s definition as part of what info rms the
e s s e n t i a l ly public character of heritage and conser-
vation decisions. Both definitions lead to the re a l-
ization that some collective, institutional solution
has to be sought in order to provide society with
heritage goods. This understanding leads dire c t ly to
the next acknowledged type of common gr o u n d ,
which relates to the political process.
The importance of politics and decision making 
Economists and culturalists both understand the
political process, and political modes of decision
making in particular, as a very important subject of
research. The two perspectives approach this inter-
est differently: economists see politics as an arena in
which certain allocation and investment decisions
a re made rega rding public goods; cultura l i s t s
embrace the political process as inescapable and, in
some cases, see the political process as the end of
conservation itself. Yet all agree that understanding
decision-making processes is a key aspect of future
research into the economics and values of heritage
conservation. Likewise, many participants saw deci-
s i o n - m a king stru c t u res (for example, re fe re n d a ,
models in which stakeholders are broadly defined
and routinely consulted, mediation, and others) as a
beneficiary of creative thinking in all fields con-
cerned with conservation.8
The concept of cultural capital 
Cultural capital was offered as a concept useful for
understanding the position of heritage as an eco-
nomic phenomenon whose full value cannot be cap-
tured by traditional economic categories and tools.
Placed alongside other types of capital9—physical
( bu i l d i n g s, roads, etc.), natural (env i r o n m e n t a l
resources and systems), and human capital—it was
proposed that the addition of cultural capital would
i m p r ove this way of t h i n king. (In this fra m ewo r k ,
material cultural heritage is a subset of cultural cap-
ital.) Natural capital, especially, seems quite analo-
gous to cultural capital.10 An interesting twist offered
on the cultural capital notion was viewing heritage
as an asset that ap p reciates over time, re q u i re s
investment, incurs risk, and so on. This thinking
positions heritage as a serious subject of investment
thinking and consideration, a reframing that poten-
tially could yield some very creative thinking about
the financing of c o n s e rvation. The cap i t a l - a s s e t
framework might also suggest ways to measure
resources and investments—indeed, the subject of
indicators (other than price) to measure heritage and
conservation was raised several times in the course
o f the meeting. Th e re are seve ral intere s t i n g
avenues of research to pursue under the umbrella of
heritage as cultural capital.
Sustainability 
Sustainability is a term of great potential for bring-
ing conservation and economic development into a
balanced and constructive relationship. The term
stems from environmentalists’ critiques of develop-
ment as a short-sighted and socially destru c t ive
force. It represents efforts to create a new kind of
development that sustains the natural environment
instead of depleting it. Instead of battling between
conservation and development, sustainability repre-
sents the hope of finding different ways to make
decisions, measure results, and ascribe value—all in
the service of achieving a healthy balance for this
and future generations. As a concept—and increas-
ingly as a set of practices and policies—sustainabili-
ty has gained wide acceptance. 
Just as cultural capital is parallel to the accepted
notion of natural capital, the concept of sustainabil-
ity was seen as applicable to the cultural heritage
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field. But how, exactly? Which principles and analyt-
ics from environmental sustainability are appropri-
ate for cultural heritage conservation? Under the
rubric of sustainability, a number of specific con-
cerns and questions can be pursued for heritage con-
servation: intergenerational equity and the steward-
ing of heritage for future generations, creation of
indicators that measure a wider range of factors
than just growth and output, better understanding
of the processes underpinning conservation as well
as the (development) processes that threaten it, and,
in general, a clearer understanding of what the her-
itage conservation field can learn from the experi-
ence of the environmental conservation field. 11
The role of the third sphere
At the suggestion of Klamer, participants considered
the unique role of the third sphere as the locus of
nonmarket, nongovernmental, economic activities
of great significance to heritage conservation. In the
worldview of civil society, decisions and discussions
not taken in the market and government spheres can
flourish in the third sphere. Third-sphere activities
have been extremely important and influential in
advancing the environmental field, for example, and
a number of parallels have been drawn between
e nvironmental and heritage conserva t i o n .
Economists embrace the third sphere as the institu-
tional setting for different kinds of transactions—
g i f t s, as Klamer described them broadly — d i s t i n c t
from market transactions and modes of g ove rn m e n-
tal action such as gra n t s, incentive s, and reg u l a t i o n s.
In short, the three spheres model, as Klamer outlines
it, seems to admit both economic and cultural analy-
ses equally and thus holds promise as a concept in
which the full range of heritage values can be
brought into a useful fra m ework, as well as a concept
that can illuminate conservation decisions. While the
t h i rd sphere was re c og n i zed as a topic of great impor-
tance, seve ral participants noted that such emphasis
on the third sphere should not distract from—or be
seen as replacing—the tra d i t i o n a l ly quite strong role
o f g ove rnments in heritage conserva t i o n .
Differences
Some major differences between economist and cul-
turalist perspectives also surfaced. Apart from the
The notion of intergenerational equity 
is very important in the context of cultural
heritage issues. Because we are talking
about long-term processes, and we can’t
escape the fact that there is an ethical
dimension to this. 
—David Throsby
When there is talk about the third sphere
in the U.S., it masks a huge tendency 
to get the government away from the
arts, away from heritage. One of the dan-
gers of taking heritage completely into
the private realm is that it gives a mes-
sage that heritage is not important
enough for the government to deal with.
—Marta de la Torre
We shouldn’t imagine that an economic
model—once we put all these things in
t h e re—will always give us the re s u l t
that, yes, we should conserve this thing.
In a number of cases the answer will still
be no. 
—Stefano Pagiola
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different subjects, methods, and disciplinary histo-
ries that characterize the two sides, an interesting
and important difference arose when there was an
attempt to impose the “economist-cultura l i s t ”
f ra m ework  on  the  meeting  and  its  part i c i p a n t s.
Whereas economics has a clear center, there is no
equivalent foundation for the culturalist field, par-
t i c u l a rly as it relates to heritage conserva t i o n .
Several factors help explain this.
The center of the economics field was explained
at length in Klamer’s background paper. It revolves
around a clear set of material issues in society (eco-
nomic production, consumption), common vocabu-
laries and methodologies for understanding them
( e s p e c i a l ly mathematics), and certain share d
assumptions (the efficiency of markets, government
action as the primary alternative to markets), all of
which have evolved over generations of professional
self-awareness.
The culturalist perspective, however, has no such
center, and in the opinion of some participants, it
should not be expected to have one. Certain lines of
a rgument, shared bodies of t h e o ry, and share d
methodology do exist among the varied culturalist
disciplines and do form a solid basis for collabora-
tion—though perhaps not a basis for collapsing the
d i ffe rences under a single, culturalist categ o ry.
Nevertheless, there is no single culturalist perspec-
tive. A number of factors explain this: the necessari-
ly multidisciplinary nature of conservation (which
clearly stretches even beyond culturalist fields to the
sciences, professions such as architecture, and the art
world); the varied professional traditions within the
social sciences and humanities, which focus on dif-
ferent aspects of social and human life and have
developed specialized practices, tools, vocabularies,
traditions, and so on, in order to address these effec-
tively; and, finally, the fact that no coherent body of
theoretical and scientific work has been created
regarding conservation and its role in society. The
comparison between economics and cultura l
approaches to heritage highlighted this lack and
helped conservation-field representatives realize this
absence in the field. It was recognized that an effort
to create such a fra m ework—one that doesn’t
impose norms or standards but, rather, preserves the
d ive rsity of approaches within the cultura l i s t
sphere—as well as to create a corresponding, articu-
late account of conservation’s role in society would
be helpful.12 This conceptual framework would be
effective for organizing existing knowledge and iden-
tifying research needs; it was suggested that the
framework would also serve to articulate the con-
servation field’s vision for its impact on society.
OUTCOME 3: A re s e a rch agenda for going
f o rw a rd: What kinds of studies do we need?
How will we use them?
Drawing on the areas of common ground identified
a b ove, participants called for empirical re s e a rc h
grounded in examples and cases, as well as for fur-
ther conceptual research on selected topics. For
example, the idea of cultural capital, as well as how
the notion of sustainability applies to conservation,
need developing as concepts befo re they can re a l ly
illuminate issues for the heritage conservation field.
This research, it was felt, is best undertaken in con-
cert with case studies or other empirical research.
It was universally recognized that case studies of
some sort will be needed to advance knowledge on
subjects that link economic and cultural perspectives
on conservation decision making. There are many
ways to design case-based research and learning.
While there was no consensus on precisely what
kinds of cases would serve GCI research best, a
number of different models were offered as possibil-
ities. One of the immediate outcomes of the meet-
ing will be a structured consideration of how to
approach and commission case histories as part of
GCI’s research. Building on the set of ideas that sur-
faced in the meeting and that are abstracted here,
GCI will formulate a more specific model for con-
sideration by the Institute and its collaborators on
economics research. 
OUTCOME 4: A report disseminating the results
of this meeting.
This report is the primary means of disseminating
the results of the meeting. This document and other
products of GCI’s research, meetings, and collabora-
tion will also be posted on GCI’s Web site in the near
future.
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Research Agenda
Based on the meeting discussions and on their own
research and experience, participants were asked to
brainstorm elements of a future research agenda on
the economics of conservation. The ideas raised
included both conceptual and empirical investiga-
tions, as well as research activities that incorporate
both levels of inquiry. The aim was not solely to map
a research agenda for GCI to undertake but to iden-
tify the most promising and important issues in the
field. GCI will take some of these activities forward,
in collaboration with other scholars and organiza-
tions; some of the other identified issues might well
be taken up by other scholars, research organiza-
tions, and conservation groups.
A number of specific models, concepts, method-
ologies, and cases were discussed, ranging from
e t h n ographic studies to econometric analy s e s.
Should one start with specific issues and problems?
Or with concepts? The consensus was that research
needed to proceed from both of these bases and
then be integrated. It was agreed that the interplay
between conceptual and empirical studies—abstract
models and specific cases—would be critical to mak-
ing progress and putting knowledge into action.
These two levels of research should continue to
inform one another.
E VA L U ATING CULTURAL VA L U E S
What is needed, overall, is a set of analytical tools to
evaluate projects which responds to both cultural
and economic values and benefits. The economics
field has developed a series of tools to evaluate the
values and benefits of heritage conservation (such as
contingent valuation and willingness-to-pay studies);
the cultural disciplines and conservation profession-
als were challenged to elaborate on existing tools
and devise additional tools to evaluate noneconom-
ic, cultural values. It was observed that the cultural-
ist fields lack a unifying body of theory regarding
values or the role of conservation in society.
The GCI, through its continuing research on
economics, intends to incorporate both kinds of
value into analytical approaches that can be applied
to empirical cases. The first specific research topic
Preservationists now think that the argu-
ments they used to invoke to win support
for preservation and conservation projects
are no longer effective—talk about gener-
ations, about stewardship, about history
and culture as a rich discourse. They feel
what they need to do now is talk about
jobs, taxes, and tourist revenue. The diffi-
culty is that this has led to atrophying of
all the other arguments. We’re now at a
point where the economic argument is the
only one being employed in the public
realm.
—Daniel Bluestone 
Can we transfer models from nature
conservation to the cultural field? There’s
still a lot of insight to be gained from
doing that in a systematic way.
—Michael Hutter
Most of what conservationists and preser-
vationists deal with is not movable, it is
site-specific. We need to focus more on
these places that are embedded in a com-
plex set of economic relations and con-
nections to local populations.
—Daniel Bluestone
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the GCI will take up on the heels of the December
meeting is the idea of sustainability. The concept of
sustainability, and the related notion of cultural cap-
ital, will be developed conceptually with regard to
conservation specifically, and a methodology for
evaluation will be formulated and applied to a few
cases.
CASE STUDIES
The need for empirical, descriptive research was
emphasized over and over by many of the meeting
participants. This type of research was most often
described as case studies, though ideas regarding
specific methodologies and formats were varied.
What are not envisioned are case studies that follow
the pedagogical model used by law and business
schools. More to the point of this research would be
case histories, or real scenarios, in which the unfold-
ing of a particular situation or case is documented
(ethnographically) and then analyzed. 
Strong recommendations were heard for estab-
lishing a clear methodology and set of research
questions befo re any case inve s t i gations are
embarked upon. The questions, concepts, method-
ologies, and overall expectations need to be clarified
before case studies are chosen and begun, though a
certain openness and flexibility should be main-
tained throughout the process. Several criteria were
suggested in the meeting discussions; most impor-
tant among them was ensuring transferability of
lessons from particular cases to general, conceptual
issues.
The analysis must be prefaced—before cases are
even begun—with a clear set of research questions.
These include: what aspects of a conservation issue
or project will be studied? Some census and analysis
of the different values? The different stakeholders?
Some analysis of decision making? Some type of
economic data collection and traditional economic
analysis? From the set of possibilities, a focused set
of research questions will be formulated as a first
step in subsequent stages of research. 
A number of concrete methodologies were sug-
gested. It was suggested that cases should address
decision-making processes (the black box within
which analytically incommensurable values are eval-
uated in practice). It was also suggested that some
cases should focus on landscape-scale conservation
issues, in order to further understanding of the
issues  particular  to  immova ble  heritage  and  its
embeddedness in places and commu n i t i e s. One
approach was layering different methodologies for
assessing value (economic and cultural), in order to
capture all the values that attend to and shape her-
itage conservation. This approach would involve a
multidisciplinary team of investigators—from eco-
nomic, cultural, and conservation fields—working
together. A second approach centered on developing
one or a few “bridge” concepts (e.g., sustainability,
c u l t u ral capital, negotiation models for decision
making) and assembling an interdisciplinary team to
work out a methodology, then apply it to specific
projects.
To support any of these case ap p r o a c h e s, it wa s
noted that some litera t u re rev i ew or bibl i ograp h i c a l
re s e a rch would be called for (e.g., on the litera t u re
c o n c e rning the role of n o n p r o fit institutions, mu l t i-
stakeholder decision making models, and ap p l i c a t i o n s
o f the ideas of social capital and natural cap i t a l ) .
ANALOGIES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
C O N S E RVAT I O N
At many points in the meeting, direct analogy was
made between heritage conservation and environ-
mental conservation. The general feeling is that
many of the concepts, tools, and methods applied to
environmental conservation can be useful in her-
itage conservation, including the economic analyses
developed in the ecological economics subfield, as
well as some of the policy devices created for con-
serving the natural environment (e.g., debt swap or
land conservancies). 
This issue is of very broad importance to her-
itage conservation. Whether one approaches her-
itage conservation as an economist, as an anthropol-
ogist, or as a policy maker, the achievements of envi-
r o n m e n t a l i s t s — i n t e l l e c t u a l ly and pra c t i c a l ly — p re-
sent themselves as models. These analogies must be
approached with caution, however.
Whereas the environmental issues and interven-
tions are developed on the strong basis of ecological
science, heritage issues have no such theoretical
model on which to rely. It cannot be assumed that
culture can be understood in strictly “ecological”
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terms—rather, one needs to refer to economic, cul-
tural, political, and social theory to understand the
“ecology” of heritage and how its conservation
operates in the context of society at large. The work
of synthesizing theory from these several social sci-
ence fields has yet to be done, though the need for
such synthesis (or at least a compendium of differ-
ent, appropriate methods) was widely acknow l-
edged in the course of the meeting. 
The potential borrowings from the environmen-
tal field first have to be understood at a conceptual
level, without the assumption that environmentalist
successes can simply be replicated for heritage. In
short, what are the limits to the applicability of eco-
logical thinking to the heritage conservation field?
Once these limits are understood, more specific con-
cepts and tools can be studied, ideally in conjunction
with research on such topics as sustainability and
cultural capital, where one of the essential research
tasks will be to evaluate the applicability of these
environmental concepts to the cultural field.
TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS
Rega rding the established economic methods that
we re outlined in the background pap e r, it was arg u e d
that contingent valuation and willingness-to-pay
studies are promising and not fu l ly developed tools
(see “The Values of C u l t u ral Heritage,” here i n ) .
These methods are strengthened when the institu-
tional arrangements in which the analysis is under-
taken are taken well into account, and when there is
full consideration of the many stakeholders invo l ve d
(including gove rn m e n t s, interest gr o u p s, bu s i n e s s e s,
and taxpaye rs) and the diffe rences between them.
F u rther application of these methods, in a broader
range of c i rc u m s t a n c e s, was seen as a useful contri-
bution (though not as a high priority—these meth-
ods are being employed by quite a number of e c o n o-
m i s t s ) . By contrast, it was widely agreed that impact
studies are signifi c a n t ly flawed because of t h e i r
inability to account for opportunity costs and for the
variety of values ascribed to heritage.
E D U C ATIONAL INITIAT I V E S
One of the keys to the success of these research
activities—both in the content of the ideas and in
There has been this whole language of
conflict—the cultural view versus the eco-
nomic view. The economic model com-
pared to some alternative model. I’m 
not sure just how useful that is. I’d much
rather think of this in an alternative
metaphor of a team. And to be successful
in conservation, we’re going to need 
a team, which includes all kinds of 
specialties.
—Stefano Pagiola
If you are really a conventional 
economist, then it will be very hard
for you to consider the concerns raised by
cultural specialists. That’s the reason why
we’re now trying to play with notions of
cultural capital and the third sphere and
the discussion of values.
—Arjo Klamer
And any conservator that takes a very
hard, traditional line will not be able to
play on these kinds of teams either.
Because what we’re doing around this
table is reexamining how we in conserva-
tion think, and how we approach things.
This flexibility and willingness to raise
questions might not necessarily change
our practice immediately, but it is 
necessary to open the mind to other 
alternatives.
—Marta de la Torre
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the dissemination of them—is building a network of
scholars, practitioners, and policy makers with an
i n t e rest in the economics of c o n s e rvation. Th e
meeting already has benefited greatly from an open-
minded, interd i s c i p l i n a ry exchange of i d e a s. As
research goes forward and becomes more concrete,
this collaboration must proceed apace. The GCI is
committed to disseminating its work to the conser-
vation field through a variety of venues, including
conferences and meetings, Web sites, printed mate-
rials such as its newsletter, AATA, and field projects.
To reach scholars working in the variety of disci-
plines that touch upon heritage conservation, new
means of outreach should be investigated. 
Two specific ideas raised in the meeting include
the creation of a listserv as a means of disseminating
information on a quick and informal basis among a
wide community, as well as initiating a consortium
of scholars and doctoral students with an interest in
these ideas. The latter idea is one perhaps best taken
up and managed by scholars themselves, perhaps
through the listserv. GCI participation would be
minimal in this, though the expanded group of
scholars and researchers would remain one of the
important audiences and resources for the GCI’s
ongoing research in this area.
Notes
1. For a list of those who attended, see “Meeting Participants.”
2. These few categories represent the major types of heritage 
values, but in any particular case, the values articulated by
stakeholders are bound to be very diverse and not necessar-
ily easily categorized. In the interest of brevity, this report
routinely refers to economic and cultural values as two
broad and distinct metacategories of value.
3. Otherwise called the third sector, nonprofit sector, civic
sphere, or voluntary sphere.
4. The extreme of the traditional approach is represented by
the arguments of economist Gary Becker and others to the
effect that virtually all aspects of human behavior can be
incorporated into a model of rational economic decision
making.
5. Participants largely avoided the pitfall of engaging in ideo-
logical debates. One of the constant subtexts of the discus-
sions, however, was the dif ficulty in separating purely eco-
nomic concerns (as defined by the economic science) from
what is really political economy, or the economy as enacted
in everyday society. Thus it is impossible (and even undesir-
able) to exclude ideological differences altogether from
these discussions.
6. The distinction made here and elsewhere between cultural
values, economic values, and social values is offered as an
analytical convenience. The author does not mean to sug-
gest that economic activity is somehow separate and dis-
tinct from culture, nor that society can be imagined with-
out cultural or economic activity.
7. These are definitions of “pure” public goods, which are
exceedingly rare. The qualities of nonexcludability and
nonrivalry are present, in some measure, in all public goods.
8. Several participants are currently engaged in research on
decision making and other policy topics.
9. The term capital as used here refers to real assets, not to
financial capital.
10. One of the part i c i p a n t s, David Th r o s by, is curre n t ly
engaged in research on this topic and will shortly publish an
a rticle, “Cultural capital,” in the Jo u rnal of C u l t u r a l
Economics.
11. Heritage scholar David Lowenthal, on a recent visit to lec-
ture at the Getty Center, emphasized the parallels between
the fate of the environmental and the cultural heritage con-
servation fields. Many other scholars and practitioners have
raised the same questions, but little research has been
undertaken on this subject, particularly on the limits of
such comparisons.
12. An effort to create this type of framework is being consid-
ered as part of future GCI conservation research.
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As part of a three-day GCI meeting on the econom-
ics of heritage conservation, held in December 1998
at the Getty Center, an open panel discussion was
presented. Members of the public and Getty staff
joined the meeting’s participants to hear presenta-
tions by three scholars involved in the meeting.
The panel members included Daniel Bluestone,
associate professor of a rc h i t e c t u ral history and
director of the Historic Preservation Program at the
U n ive rsity of Vi rginia in Charlottesville; Arj o
Klamer, professor of the economics of art and cul-
ture at Erasmus University in Rotterdam; and David
Throsby, professor of economics at the School of
Economics and Financial Studies, Macquarie
University in Sydney.
Randall Mason, a senior project specialist at the
GCI, moderated the discussion.
Randall Mason: The starting point of t h i s
inquiry is that economics can value some aspects of
heritage and its conservation very well but does not
address other aspects well at all. We’ve been focusing
on the contributions that economic analysis can
make to our understanding of conservation deci-
sions. We’ve also been trying to identify the limits of
economic analy s i s. With that acknow l e d g m e n t ,
we ’ve come together to try to build common
ground between conservation professionals, schol-
ars of culture, and economists.
David Throsby: We sometimes feel, when we
speak as economists among people who are interest-
ed in art, that we’re a bit like the specter at the feast.
You can talk about art all you like, but at the end of
the day, there’s a grim economic reality out there,
and we all have to come to terms with it.
One reason why economists find this subject of
art and heritage interesting is that in the world at
large, the economic agenda is taking precedence
over just about everything else—that much in our
daily lives is dictated by an economic agenda over
which we feel we don’t have a great deal of control
and that is asserting a set of values that we don’t feel
entirely comfortable with.
One thing that has led to the economic agenda’s
dominant role is the globalization of markets. The
marketplace has become the thing that determines
how resources are allocated, what gets produced,
what gets consumed, and so on. And yet when we
think about conservation, we think about things that
h ave nothing to do with the market—historical
value, the meaning of objects and sites to people,
and even more spiritual things. These can’t be cap-
t u red by processes of m o n e t a ry exc h a n g e .
Economists have been trying to come to terms with
the fact that a lot of what happens in the arts and
cultural heritage exists outside of markets. One
thing we’ve talked about in the last few days is the
way we can conceptualize this.
Two things are quite intrinsic to the conceptual-
ization of heritage from an economic point of view.
The first is that we can see heritage items as being
capital assets, as things we have inherited from the
past and are going to transmit to the future. To use
a term that is gaining wider acceptance, we can see
them as cultural capital—that is, something we may
inherit or that we may create by new investment,
and that we have to maintain. If we don’t maintain
it, it decays. If we conceive of heritage as being cul-
tural capital, then we may be able to think not only
in economic terms but in cultural terms as well.
The second thing is the notion, closely linked to
cultural capital, of sustainability. We can think of
heritage in the same terms that we apply to the envi-
ronment. We’ve come to understand the relation-
ship between the economy and ecological systems
by thinking about sustainable development. We
inherit a stock of natural capital—the resources of
the world, fresh air and water, and so on—and we
pass it on to future generations.
We can think in these terms about cultural her-
itage. When everybody in this room is long dead,
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the historic sites, the great artifacts, the great paint-
ings will still exist. We have the responsibility to
think about them in that long term. The notion of
sustainability can encapsulate the way in which
these things relate to the economy. The sort of
development that rips out forests and pollutes the
atmosphere is not sustainable in the long term.
Behavior that treats cultural heritage in the same
sort of exploitative way is also not sustainable in the
long term.
Arjo Klamer : We economists have good reasons
to be very content nowadays. Market ideologies are
dominant. On the political left and right, people
think in terms of markets to solve most of our prob-
lems. I find this happening with the cultural admin-
istrators, directors of theaters, of museums—they
all go for the market strategy. This might be caused
partly by a withdrawal of governments from financ -
ing cultural activities. The popular way of thinking
is that if the government withdraws, then we have to
have recourse to the markets. It’s strange, then, to
find myself as an economist actually opposing this
economization of the world and having to point out
its limitations.
Economic science has been affected by what one
calls “modernist values.” Just like a Mondrian paint-
ing, we think in terms of squares—square thinking,
you could call it. We want to be very precise and
mechanistic in thinking about the world. This ten-
dency has led to the demoralization of the econom-
ic imagination. We have left values and morals out
of our discipline. And this becomes a problem as
economic values tend to crowd out the other values
we adhere to.
As a society, we don’t only work toward increas-
ing our economic capital that generates economic
values; we invest a great deal in social capital, which
is the ability to associate with others, to form com-
mu n i t i e s. And I would chara c t e r i ze cultura l
capital as the ability to inspire or to be inspired. It
seems to be a critical attribute of the good life and
the good society that we’re able to do this.
Markets don’t do well generating social values.
It’s an open question whether they can contribute to
our cultural capital. Governments, of course, repre-
sent a very different sort of mechanism by which
values are generated. Governments have proven to
be maybe not so good at generating economic value
(although a great deal of economic value is generat-
ed through governments), but they are better at gen-
erating values that are part of the social and cultur-
al cap i t a l — values like solidarity and justice.
Governments are also effective at generating public
goods that in some way are shared, are valued col-
lectively, but cannot be provided by the market. A
great deal of the provisioning of the cultural her-
itage—one kind of public good—is generated with-
in governments.
But there is another sphere of activity that, in
generating social values, is far more important than
the market and governments combined. I call it the
third sphere. Others talk about civil society, or the
“third sector.” It is a sphere of institutions like non-
profit organizations, clubs, and families. In the third
sphere, the most important instrument of exchange
is the gift—not the market transaction or govern-
ment action—and gifts rely on the principle of reci-
procity: a lot of values are exchanged in some way or
another, only it’s not set and determined what you
get in return. The third sphere is critical in generat-
ing social capital, the sense of community and iden-
tity.
If you want people to take responsibility for cul-
tural heritage, it may be necessary to seek ways of
dealing with cultural heritage in the third sphere.
You cannot rely only on governments.
Daniel Bluestone: I’ve been concerned with the
way that market ideologies have become dominant
in preservation and conservation. Arjo talked about
the way in which the economic discourse has crowd-
ed out a discussion of cultural values. What has gen-
erated this is a rightward drift in our national poli-
tics. At the local and national levels, the sense is that
the way to justify cultural and social values is to
embrace an economic model and to insist that jobs,
income, wealth, and taxes are all things that can be
generated by historic preservation and conservation
activity.
It’s well worth having people in conservation be
able to marshal economics as part of an argument.
But my concern is that the economic arguments are
articulated in a way that begins to atrophy the other
a rguments for conservation. Other arg u m e n t s —
based on social and cultural values—are left impre-
cise and inarticulate in the rush for precision in cal-
culating the economic impact of preservation or
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conservation.
It is difficult for the economic models to take
hold of the sobering reality that traditionally the
market has been a destroyer of value of historic sites
more than a savior of them. The language of the
market being the savior is actually a radical turn
from a much longer discourse that has the market as
a destroyer.
The preservation and conservation field tends to
be imprecise in its arguments because, for a long
time, we assumed that there was total agreement on
the values and benefits of our work. We adopted a
somewhat high-style, canonical approach to cultural
benefits. But this sense of a shared appreciation
based on art-historical values has fractured in the last
fifteen to twenty years. We’ve broadened the defini-
tion of cultural heritage far beyond the standard art-
historical understanding of beauty that has been the
central paradigm for a very long time. As an alterna-
tive, I would propose that the sustainability model is
terribly useful because it takes into account the way
in which we’re stewarding things received from the
past.
Historic preservation, community preservation,
cultural heritage, and conservation ought to be the
keystone of sustainable development. The best thing
we can do is fi g u re out how to shepherd the
resources in the built landscape that we already have
and to figure out strategies for making those useful
to ourselves and to future generations.
One thing that economics has helped us do
through the model of sustainability is to ask not sim-
ply the current value but the value over a whole
series of generations. So what we’re interested in fig-
uring out is how we might model this for heritage
conservation, how we might be more articulate
about what the values are, and in so doing be chal-
lenged (those of us in conservation) to be similarly
precise about what it is that we value about heritage.
Audience member : You are interested in conser-
vation and preservation. Seems to me, these are
defensive steps. I also hear you talk about paintings,
about culture, and this is something that is newly
created. Are both of these part of “heritage”?
Bluestone: One of the insights that crystallized
in this meeting—and it’s been crystallized elsewhere
in the literature—is that preservation and conserva-
tion are part of a process that doesn’t cease with the
preservation and conservation of the site. It’s just
the latest step in caring for our cultural resources.
These acts are really as creative and expressive of
current cultural values as the work a painter does. I
wouldn’t want to pass conservation up as simply
conservative or defensive. It ’s an extremely creative
and, in some contexts, a provocative act.
Audience member : One consideration I wanted
to interject is the function of the works of art that
we talk about preserving. For me, the best example
is Louis XIV creating Versailles and all else that he
created. The creation of art has been about power
and prestige. Bearing in mind that these works have
always had a political function can inform consider-
ations about how to exploit and preserve them
today.
Bluestone: For a long time, conservationists
haven’t had to confront historical context. If the
paint is coming off of the painting, we have strate-
gies for dealing with that. If the mortar joints are
deteriorating out of a monument, we can fix it.
What you raise is our need as conservationists and
preservationists to engage in an act of interpretation
that surfaces in the relationship between the materi-
al world and art, and the people in the society
around it. The reason to do that is not only to better
understand the cultural heritage but to more fully
understand our own participation in the world in
which we live, and to empower our citizens with
regard to the very same sets of relations.
Audience member : It seems to me that you’re
talking about two distinct issues. One of them is the
economic; then you insert social or cultural capital.
And you talk about sustainability. But these are black
boxes, as far as I’ve heard so far.
Klamer : We are trying to expand the field of
inquiry so that economists can participate with oth-
ers from different fields to illuminate these black
boxes. We economists are not equipped to figure out
how cultural capital is generated or how social capi-
tal is generated. Anthropologists, art historians, his-
torians, and sociologists have done a great deal
more. We have to explore those dark boxes in order
to come to a comprehensive picture that allows us to
figure out how people decide what to add to the
good life through conservation. Decisions about cul-
tural heritage are part of that. But if you only focus
on what we can already enlighten with economic
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a n a ly s i s, then you fall short. So agreed: bl a c k
boxes—that is good for us. Because that means that’s
there’s a lot of work to do.
Audience member : What are the ways to bring
conservation back to the grass roots and to account
for more than market values?
Throsby: One way is to involve the grass roots
more in decision-making structures—having people
who are genuine stakeholders in decision-making
structures participate, rather than have some sort of
ex t e rnal economic or investment agenda fo i s t e d
upon them.
Klamer : Sometimes the best design has local cit-
izens taking charge, and the best strategy might be
for the government to withdraw and give way to
local initiative. At least, that’s what we observe to be
how it usually works. But of course, as a policy
maker, I imagine that’s a hard strategy to follow.
Mason: I think we’ve performed a remarkable
act by even having this meeting, where economists
and anthropologists and people in conservation are
sitting down and opening their minds to very differ-
ent approaches to conservation. This interdiscipli-
nary dialogue is essential to understanding the role
of conservation in society generally and, as we’ve
seen, to understanding how economics can shape
conservation and the arts.
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Introduction
Who will contest the value of cultural heritage in
general? How much are people willing to sacrifice to
finance a particular object of cultural heritage? How
then is the value of cultural heritage in the final
instance realized? What is its price?
Leave it to economists to turn any discussion to
the issue of price. It is no different in the discussion
of the value of cultural heritage. Economists may
want to know, for instance, why people value a par-
ticular object of cultural heritage and yet are unwill-
ing to contribute to its conservation.
Quite another discussion turns to issues of iden-
tity, history, community, and all those values that
come into play in the valuing of heritage—whether
pyramids, old paintings, antique smokestacks, or liv-
ing cultures. Allow us to call the art historians,
archaeologists, and so many others who prefer to
think about cultural heritage in these terms cultural-
ists. Culturalists, as opposed to economists, are the
people who come to the heritage from fields such as
anthropology, sociology, history, and geography. On
other occasions, they are referred to as humanists.
While economists discuss the exchange and use
value of objects of cultural heritage, culturalists will
focus on their cultural and social values.1
The discussions of economists and culturalists
tend to be quite distinct, so much so that we are
inclined to speak of two distinct discursive practices
and, hence, two distinct cultures. It is as if econo-
mists and culturalists operate in two diffe re n t
worlds, with very little exchange between them.
Frictions and frustrations are noticeable whenever
the representatives of the two cultures try to talk
with one another. We are reminded of the two cul-
t u res that C. P. Snow himself embodied and
observed. He noticed difficulties in the integration
of the culture of (natural) scientists with that of (lit-
erary) artists.
This paper is a first attempt to integrate eco-
nomic practice into the general discourse on cultur-
al heritage. Thus far, culturalists have dominated
that discourse. Attempts of economists to con-
tribute appear to have made little impact. The GCI’s
successful first meeting on the values of cultural
heritage showed the difficulty of integrating eco-
nomic arguments into the discussion. One reason
for this difficulty may be a lack of familiarity with
economics on the part of most culturalists. Another
reason may be their resistance, or suspicion, toward
the imperialistic inclinations of economics as a disci-
pline and the particular, if not peculiar, vocabulary
with which economists analyze everything human.
In the first part of this paper, we attempt to make
the application of this specialist vocabulary to her-
itage understandable.
The ultimate concern is that economists and
economic practices insuffi c i e n t ly ap p reciate the
wide range of values of cultural heritage. This,
therefore, feeds the political resistance to providing
the necessary finances for the preservation of cul-
tural heritage, with the consequence that commer-
cial activities take ove r. Economists, conve rs e ly,
complain about culturalists who fail to acknowledge
the economic realities regarding cultural heritage
and efforts at conservation. Part II of this paper
attempts to coax both sides into a common dis-
course. It attempts to show culturalists that com-
mon economic discourse has a great deal of value to
offer to the subject of cultural heritage, while also
acknowledging the limitations of the economist’s
gaze and tools. Similarly, the paper attempts to per-
suade economists of the necessity of taking into
account the culturalist discourse concerning cultur-
al heritage.
The first part of this paper deals with how the
economy and economists appreciate the value of
the heritage. It is thus concerned with valuation in
the market economy and valuation by economists.
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In the second part, we suggest that the economy and
economists also engage in the valorization of the
heritage.
As far as the strictly economic argument is con-
cerned, this paper proposes that:
Scarcity matters: Preservation of certain struc-
tures or objects is costly because resources such
as time, money, and effort are scarce. This con-
text requires that choices be made.
The public nature of cultural herita ge mat-
ters: Because many objects and structures of
cultural heritage have the character of public
goods, markets fail to realize their full value, and
hence, a nonmarket arrangement of some kind
or another is required. Cultural heritage is a
public good in that no one can be excluded from
enjoying it, and everyone can enjoy it at the
same time.
I n c e n t i ves ma t t e r : G ove rnment invo l ve m e n t
and regulation need to take into account the
incentives of those who pay and administer, as
well as of those who enjoy the cultural heritage.
As far as the culturalist argument is concerned,
this paper concludes that:
Values matter : The valuation of cultural her-
itage involves a wide range of values, of which
economic values are only one dimension.
Culture matters: Valuation is context depen-
dent, so it should not come as a surprise that cer-
tain cultural settings more than others appreci-
ate certain objects and structures as cultural her-
itage and, as such, wo rt hy of p re s e rva t i o n .
Because cultures evolve, the values of the her-
itage are in constant flux.
The paper finds common ground among econo-
mist and culturalist arguments insofar as:
D i s t i n c t i ve spheres of values ma t t e r : Due to the
special values of c u l t u ral heritage as identified by
c u l t u ra l i s t s, the handling of c u l t u ral heritage has
s t i mulated a variety of economic solutions, va ry-
ing from gove rnment invo l vement to pure mar-
ket solutions, and including all kinds of i n fo rm a l
a rrangements based on gifts and re c i p r o c i t y.
The mode of f inancing matters: The mode of
financing cultural heritage has consequences for
the sphere of values involved. Financing is part
of the valorization process. Voluntary contribu-
tions have somewhat different effects than out-
right government subsidies or income out of the
sphere of the market. Policies on cultural her-
itage may need to take these differences into
account.
The identification of stakeholders matters:
Decisions and policies about cultural heritage
need to be based on an assessment of the rele -
vant stakeholders.
Economics matters: Economic factors play a
role in the valuing of heritage and the practice of
conservation as do art historians, connoisseurs,
art managers, and policy makers. Just like art
critics, presentations in museums, Unesco desig-
nations, and conservation projects, economic
arrangements can modify how the heritage is
perceived. To ignore economic aspects is to dis-
regard one of the constitutive forces behind the
heritage.
In Part I, we take stock of possibly useful contri-
butions of economists to the discussion of cultural
heritage. It attempts to be relevant to culturalists as
well as to economists (who may find the survey
wanting, but the aim, after all, is not to satisfy their
needs). Part II attempts to expand the range of val-
ues to be considered. It points to a variety of possi-
ble financial arrangements and their impact on her-
itage and conservation. Throughout the paper, a
number of specific cases are presented in separate
boxes.
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Part I: Economists on Cultural Heritage
KINDS OF HERITA G E
Before we start our exploration of the economics of
cultural heritage, we need to define the domain of
the inquiry. Because cultural heritage is an umbrella
term for a wide range of elements, confusion could
easily ensue. In general, the term includes objects,
structures, and other products of cultures and indi-
viduals that have been passed from previous genera-
tions to the present and are valued because they are
representative of a particular culture and are, at least
partly, valued because of their age. (As already
noted, heritage is valued for these and many other
reasons.) These objects of inheritance supposedly
distinguish themselves from ordinary goods like
cars, ice cream, houses, or rocks, because they are
“cultural.” Presumably, the label cultural implies a
specific valuation, indicating that the object has
something distinctive and can be considered to be
p a rt of a certain tradition, gr o u p, commu n i t y,
region, nation, continent, or whatever, entity. To call
an inheritance cultural furthermore implies that its
valuation is a social activity rather than the act of a
single individual. Whether you like chocolate ice
cream or not is a matter of personal taste, but your
aesthetic liking of Re m b ra n d t’s N i g h t w a t ch , fo r
instance, is irrelevant to its appreciation as part of
Dutch cultural heritage.
Table 1 provides a general classification of cul-
tural heritage, adding a few examples of each cate-
gory. Although it is common to include intangibles
such as languages and traditions as part of cultural
heritage, we will focus here on tangible cultural her-
itage, both immovable and movable. This plan is in
keeping with the mission of the Getty Conservation
Institute. Because it reflects common pra c t i c e
among economists who deal with the heritage, the
main focus of this paper will be on the immovables.
(Even though the valuation of intangible cultural
heritage may bear on the valuation of tangible
objects of cultural interest, we will exclude them
from the present paper.)
The tangible category comprises elements rang-
ing widely; it includes monumental cathedrals like
the one in Chartres, France; city mansions like
Gaudi’s Casa Mila in Barcelona; the many country
houses all over England; the caves of Lascaux, with
their painted walls; a sculpture like the Statue of
Liberty in New York; underwater sites all over the
world, where treasures reside in wrecks at the bot-
tom of the sea; the ancient city center of Evora in
Portugal; archaeological sites such as Pompeii in
Italy; the Great Wall in China; the temple site in
Palenque, Mexico; and the Borobudur in Indonesia.
Such monumental heritage is outnumbered by a
plethora of equally important vernacular and less
well-known examples.
I f one acknowledges that the heritage is a social
a c t iv i t y, it should be noted that all these cited ex a m-
ples of c u l t u ral heritage did not become heritage
i n s t a n t a n e o u s ly. Re c ognition as such usually
i nvo l ves a long process of d e l i b e ration and neg o t i a-
tion, involving both conscious decisions and cultur-
al change. The listing of objects and stru c t u res as
c u l t u ral heritage is critical. Listing (or designation)
is managed by diffe rent kinds of a u t h o r i t i e s, at a
range of g e ographical scales. Some cities keep a list
o f their local heritage. Most We s t e rn countries have
a list of their cultural heritage. Unesco has draw n
up the Wo rld Heritage List. In some countries, pri-
vate organizations have their own lists, separa t e
from the official one. Listing not only invo l ve s
re c ognition but usually also enfo rces a regime of
p re s e rvation, conservation, or re s t o ra t i o n .
(Economists can wonder what economic considera-
tions play a role in the listing of an object or not,
and what the economic consequences of listing are .
Does listing imply additional costs for the ow n e r ?
Or does it suggest that the object is considered a
p u blic good?)
M ova ble objects of c u l t u ral heritage pose a
range of special challenges. They can be easily trad-
ed (and thus exported) or otherwise removed from
the public domain. As a consequence, the potential
for conflict between economic and culturalist con-
siderations is greater (as with the myriad contempo-
ra ry disputes over repatriation or illicit tra d e ) .
Because these objects are considered cultural, the
question arises as to whether their legal owners can
do with them as they please. For example, one
owner—the Japanese buyer of van Gogh’s Dr. Gachet
(purchased at a record $75 million)—even went so
far as to express the wish that he be cremated with
his precious possession.
Tangible Herita ge
Immovable Built heritage
Monuments: buildings, sculptures, inscriptions, cave dwellings
(Listed) buildings: buildings in use
Groups of buildings: city centers
Sites (also underwater): archaeological, historical, ethnological
Cultural landscapes 
Movable Artifacts
Paintings
Sculptures
Objects
Collections
Media
Audiovisual media
Books
Plays
Scores
Consumer and industrial goods
Intangible Herita ge Art expressions: music, dance, literature, theater
Martial arts
Languages
Living cultures
(Oral) traditions
Narratives
Revolutions
Networks
Folklore
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
Development of the Economic Discourse on
Cultural Heritage
The economics of cultural heritage falls as a topic
for research under the heading of cultural econom-
ics. Other topics in this special field in economics are
the economics of the performing and visual arts and
of cultural industries. Economic research into cul-
tural heritage has picked up only recently—at least if
we set aside for a moment the literature on the eco-
nomics of museums and art markets. In museums
and art markets, immovable cultural heritage has
not been the primary focus of research.2
The economist Sir Alan Peacock was the pioneer
with his 1978 article entitled “Preserving the Past”
(Peacock 1978). In the subsequent decade, some of
the discussion died down, with the exception of a
few articles (Vaughan 1984; Nijkamp 1991). The last
few years have witnessed a flurry of activities in the
form of a number of edited volumes, such as a
report of an ICOMOS symposium (ICOMOS 1993),
Hutter and Rizzo (1997), Schuster, Monchaux, and
Riley (1997), Peacock (1998), and first drafts of a
report, being prepared by ICOMOS, on the eco-
nomics of the heritage (Droogenbroeck 1994).
Throughout the text, we will discuss selected topics
from these contributions.
Recent developments in the economics of cul-
tural heritage have been informed by research in
environmental economics. A number of analytical
tools from this field have been borrowed for applica-
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Table 1. Classification of cultural heritage.
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tion to the heritage. At times, however, it looks as if
the interaction involves the transfer of an even larg-
er framework. This factor is not widely acknowl-
edged, but Mohr and Schmidt (1997) are a notable
exception. When they discuss insights from environ-
mental economics, they find that “These terms [for
non-use value] can be instantaneously transposed to
the realm of cultural heritage.” To make their case,
they showed the ease which in the environmental
economics litera t u re, the wo rd n a t u r a l can be
exchanged for cultural without a loss of meaning.
As this exercise makes clear, the implication is
that our attitude toward cultural heritage resembles
our attitude toward nature and its history. Apart
from whether this alleged resemblance is justified, it
may prevent one from treating cultural heritage in
its own right. If we pursue this trajectory we may
lose sight of distinctive characteristics of cultural
heritage, such as its value for national identity. Thus,
d i rect comparisons to environmental economics
have to be handled carefully.
The Economic Approach
As mentioned above, economists have a particular
language with which they try to make sense of
things. They like to say that they have a box of tools
that they use to analyze any subject, whether it is the
choice to have children or the choice to preserve one
object rather than another. This is not the place to
open the entire toolbox, but a few pointers may help
the reader who is unfamiliar with the language and
tools of economists (for more, see Frey and
Pommerehne 1989). The next few sections review a
number of important concepts.
Consumer Sovereignty is the Key
“Consumption is the sole end of production,” wrote
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776). In the
late nineteenth century, economists picked up on
this cue of the father of their discipline and put the
consumer center stage in their analysis. Their main
character is that of the rational consumer who
chooses freely from the products that the market has
to offer. Consumer sovereignty is the concept that
economists use to assert the autonomy of freely
choosing consumers and their ultimate right to
determine what is valuable (and thus worth the sac-
rifice of some of their resources) and what is not.
This bias toward the consumer clearly differs
from the discourse of much culturalist work, in
which the most important category is collective
“culture.” When artists claim autonomy in their pro-
duction of art, the economist will wonder how con-
sumers value that production. Or in discussions
about the value of the heritage for a country, the
economist regards its value to individual citizens.
Understanding this point goes a long way toward
understanding the bias that economists introduce in
their policy recommendations.
Related to the notion of consumer sovereignty is
the standard decision to leave the determination of
consumer tastes or preferences out of economic
analysis. Conventional economic inquiry starts with
the assumption that “tastes are given.” This would
mean, in light of our present subject, that the values
o f heritage are taken as given. Nothing could diffe r
m o re gre a t ly from the insights of c u l t u ralist analy-
s i s. If p ressed for a justification, the economic ana-
lyst will use the Latin fo rmula De gustibus non est dis-
putandum [ Th e re is no disputing taste], (Becker and
S t i gler 1977). As we will see later, we will have to
violate this convention in order to seek openings for
a fruitful exchange with the culturalist discourse.
Scarcity Matters
When g iven a chance, economists will point to the
fact that resources are limited, and choices are,
therefore, inevitable. Economic analysis focuses on
the rational choices that agents (like consumers, pro-
ducers, and workers) make in the face of scarcity. No
matter how valuable the experts consider an object
to be, preserving and conserving may be so costly
that choosing to expend the scarce resources on
alternative objects may be the rational thing to do.
Surely, The Nightwatch is priceless, but even the
Dutch might put it up for sale if starvation or some
life-threatening disaster could be averted with the
receipts of the sale. Often, in less developed coun-
tries, the issue of investing in survival needs is very
pressing, and investment in heritage is therefore sac-
rificed.
The Market as the Most Efficient Allocator of
Scarce Resources
Whereas most noneconomists are quick to defer to
some kind of authority for decisions on who gets
scarce resources, economists have a professional
faith in the objective, impersonal mechanism of the
market. In their perspective, the forces of supply and
demand bring about the most efficient solution to
whatever scarcity problem exists. No intervention is
needed.
Market outcomes are considered efficient when
no other outcome can improve one party without
making another worse off. The rationale is that mar-
kets provide incentives to actors to enhance efficien-
cy. Heritage administrators have an incentive to ‘sell’
their monument in a way that suits their visitors best
(posting signs, making it easily accessible, offering
services), because otherwise visitors would go to
another site.
One difficulty that economists encounter when
they try to apply the logic of the market to cultural
or artistic products is the definition of product. In
the case of a museum, it is not clear, for example,
whether we should consider visits, the number of
exhibitions, or cultural experiences as products. We
encounter a similar problem in the case of cultural
heritage. As long as we do not know what the her-
itage product is (what is the product of, say, a pyra-
mid?), it is impossible to determine what gets sup-
plied and what gets demanded.
Price Is the Key
W h e n ever there is a disequilibrium (quantities
demanded are unequal to quantities supplied), an
adjustment in price will, in principle, bring about a
new equilibrium. As an outcome of the market,
price constitutes the objective value or the exchange
value of a good. The subjective value—that is, the
value that individuals attach to that good—will be
different from the exchange value. Exchange value is
the outcome of the market process that led these
diverging, subjective values of demanders and sup-
pliers to a single price. Generally, this exchange
value, or price, is what we understand by economic
value or market value.
The auction is a good illustration of market val-
ues and prices. Bidders differ in their subjective valu-
ation of a piece. Private collectors want to complete
their collections, or consider the artwork to be a reli-
able investment, or simply want to hang the painting
in their houses. Curators want to acquire a piece for
their museums or research projects because of its
art-historic value; national authorities want to keep
a piece in their country. By the raising of hands,
these various subjective valuations are negotiated.
The price finally expresses the “objective” (i.e., col-
lective) value of the object.
Classification of Research in the Economics of
Cultural Heritage
In general, economic research on cultural heritage is
organized around four distinct but interrelated top-
ics, each of which will be discussed below. The four
topics are:
• Market failure
• Value of cultural heritage 
• Who pays, who benefits, and who cares?, and 
• Institutional solutions.
MARKET FA I L U R E
An important part of economic discourse, certainly
when cultural products are the subject, deals with
possible market failures. Market failure is the inabil-
ity of a market to provide goods in a satisfactory
way. Markets are unsatisfactory when they do not
lead to efficient outcomes or when outcomes are
undesirable. Because economic frameworks rely on
the idea of well-functioning markets, market failures
give economists a great deal to think about and are
often the motivation for policy actions.
In standard economic environments, such as the
market for cars, the most important reason for mar-
ket failure is the existence of monopolies. In the con-
text of cultural heritage, the most important causes
of market failure are the occurrence of public or col-
lective goods and externalities.
Public Goods and Externalities
Public goods are goods that many people value but
that may not be provided in normal markets because
they cannot be properly priced. This occurs when no
one can be excluded from the consumption of a
good, and, if it is consumed by an individual, others
cannot be prevented from consuming it as well. A
national monument on the central square of the
c apital is a public good, because eve ryone can
admire it and no one can be excluded from doing so.
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The enjoyment of one does not come at the expense
of another (as is the case with purely private goods,
like an ice cream cone).
Externalities are benefits, or costs, of an eco-
nomic good that are not accounted for by some kind
of market transaction. Defined as external to the
workings of the market, such effects can be positive
or negative. Many people benefit from the preserva-
tion program for a beautiful country house without
contributing a penny. Their enjoyment is called an
externality of investment in the house: it is not
priced in a market. Another example is an increasing
demand for nearby hotel rooms by visitors coming
to see the house. Conversely, this investment can
generate a negative externality by attracting hordes
of tourists whose cars spoil the lawns of neighbors
without bringing them any financial compensation.
In such a case, the neighbors will ask for gove rn-
ment regulation to prohibit trespassing on their
l aw n s. But how will the owner get compensation fo r
the positive ex t e rnalities that we re generated by
his/her investment in the country house? Economists
like to look for cre a t ive solutions to such questions,
such as levying a tourist or “pre s e rvation” tax on
hotel reve nu e s. Economists are reluctant to look too
q u i c kly for outright gove rnmental solutions in the
fo rm of regulations and gove rnment spending. Th e
a rgument is that no one knows better how indiv i d u-
als value objects than those individuals themselve s
( recall the assumption of consumer sove re i g n t y ) .
Along with the public-good status of cultural
heritage, externalities are a major concern of econo-
mists. Koboldt (1997) distinguishes between “pro-
duction externalities” and “consumption externali-
ties.” When a site draws large crowds, local retailers,
re s t a u ra n t s, and hotels will benefit gre a t ly. Th e
tourist expenditures are production externalities of
that site. The jobs that they generated are as well.
Consumption externalities include benefits in terms
of a strengthened national identity, educational ben-
efits, and benefits for future generations. The ques-
tion is how the owner of the site can realize those
benefits—that is, how the owner can internalize the
externalities of the site. Related to this is the ques-
tion of whether the government can bring about the
internalization of externalities so as to improve
incentives for the conservation of cultural heritage.
In the economic literature, the public-good char-
acter of cultural heritage is a foregone conclusion
( Peacock 1978, Peacock 1994, Mosetto 1994,
Benhamou 1996, 1997; Hutter and Rizzo 1997). The
question remains, however, exactly how “public”
particular objects are. Public goods are often to
some degree private, and there are many aspects of
“publicness” that can make goods qualify as public.
Even so, monuments and sites can be fenced in to
allow only paying consumers. The same restrictions
can apply to movable heritage, which can be held in
museums charging admission, in libraries, or in pri-
vate collections. It is more difficult to privatize the
public good of intangible or nonmaterial heritage,
but even in these cases, barriers for consumption are
conceivable (think of private education of art and
culture).
Peacock (1994) notes furthermore that heritage
is often not produced in response to some consumer
demand but comes about as a by-product of other
products. City centers, shipwrecks, and archaeologi-
cal sites are not part of a cultural heritage by design,
but they emerge as heritage because art historians,
policy makers, scientists, and the like have called
attention to their value as such. It would be difficult
to speak here of a market with a supply of, and
demand for, cultural heritage. The heritage was not
produced to satisfy existing tastes; instead, in the
past, buildings, city centers, plays, and oral traditions
were created for their own reasons.
Three Dilemmas
In addition to posing problems as a public good, cul-
tural heritage and its conservation present a distinc-
tive problem vis-à-vis generations: not only do they
generate benefits for people now but they also do so
for future generations. As Peacock (1994) has noted,
heritage presents “a future for the past.” The ques-
tion, then, is how we account for those future bene-
fits in the present.
Mosetto (1994) identifies three dilemmas that are
related to this problem. These are the “dying-arts
dilemma,” the “future-generations dilemma,” and
the “optional consumer dilemma.” The dying-arts
dilemma is defined by the question “How can we
judge the opportunity costs3 of investing resources
in preservation of an art form which is otherwise
bound to die [or of investing to prevent the disap-
pearance of objects]”(Mosetto 1994:89). Decisions
about investing in heritage are often irreversible.
Benhamou (1997) points out that owners of objects
or structures that might qualify as cultural heritage
cannot know for certain whether preservation will
prove worth the costs in the future. It is difficult to
judge whether decaying objects or structures will be
felt as a loss in the future: one cannot foresee regret.
Consulting with experts—as is a common practice
for dealing with this lack of knowledge—is a second-
best option. For economists, adhering to consumer
sovereignty and letting consumers decide for them-
selves is the best option.
The fu t u re - g e n e rations dilemma and the
optional-consumer dilemma are slight modifi c a-
tions of the dying-arts dilemma. Because fu t u re
g e n e rations do not yet exist, it is hard to anticipate
h ow they will perc e ive the pre s e rved heritage.
Optional consumers may not wish to ex p ress their
utility of the heritage objects now, but they may
want do so in the near fu t u re .
In short, the decision to invest in the preserva-
tion of a particular object or structure involves a
great deal of uncertainty as to the benefits, both in
the present and in the future. The decision not to
invest is irreversible, however, because the object or
structure may be lost forever. Market solutions may
be biased toward such irreversible decisions, and
great regret is possible later. Those responsible for
the cultural heritage of a certain community might
be less concerned with market pressures and be risk
averse; hence, they might overinvest in cultural her-
itage. To be realistic, however, it might be too sim-
plistic to depict the heritage as dying. In practice, sit-
uations do not always present clear invest/don’t-
invest options. Deterioration and adaptive reuse are
often the reality. Decisions are often made for inter-
im measures and partial conservation treatments,
thus deferring the ultimate investment decision.
Normative Instances of Market Failure
The forms of market failure that we have identified
up to now are objective, in the sense that we simply
observe that certain goods of value are not provided
by markets. Another category of market failure—
“ n o rm a t ive” market fa i l u re — re p resents what “should
b e ” as opposed to “what is.” In other wo rd s, given
our expectations of h ow many heritage goods
should be provided to society and given the inability
of markets to provide or distribute them, the failure
is described as normative.
Normative failures of markets are faults that pol-
icy makers and culturalists attribute to market out-
comes or market processes. They may, for example,
judge market outcomes to be unjust, or they may
find market arrangements for the provision of cer-
tain goods inappropriate or even immoral. When
the market outcome for the provision of cultural
heritage implies that lower-income users will be pre-
vented from enjoying the benefits because they can-
not pay the entry fee, we can say that the market
fails to be just. When this is so, some action or
another may follow, like appropriation by a govern-
mental agency, a subsidy for conservation, or a regu-
lation enforcing easy and inexpensive entry. (Many
countries actually do stipulate regular openings of
monuments in private hands.)
When markets fail to protect cultural heritage
for generations to come (as opposed to supplying
present needs), we may think of another kind of fail-
ure. In this regard, Throsby speaks of the norm of
intergenerational equity (1995).
Another normative failure of the market occurs
when certain people observe that it fails to provide
goods that they consider highly valuable. Think of a
museum or historical site. Some people may highly
value regular educational programs in their town for
all kinds of reasons; yet, if left to the market, there
might be no chance for such exhibitions to take
place. Economists call such a good a merit good.
Merit goods are goods that are deemed to be intrin-
sically good, but if left to the market, they would be
underproduced. Note that the merit of educational
heritage visits is judged by certain people and may
not be recognized by others. In the field of heritage,
such judgments often come from government com-
missions and experts. The policy question here is
whether political power can be wielded to influence
the government to help realize production of merit
goods.
The norms that motivate the observation of
market failures may change through time and across
groups. As Peacock (1978, 1997) relates, the gaze of
an outsider may distinguish in an old Italian square a
site of cultural heritage, whereas those living around
the square see a modern design in its stead. The rea-
sons behind conservation change over time and dif-
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fer from group to group. The norms are therefore
social and cultural. At times, interest in cultural her-
itage may have simply been that of preservation;
nowadays, attention for objects of cultural heritage
appears to be motivated by concerns about national
or local identity (Klamer 1997) or by the profession-
al interests of art historians, archaeologists, and
other conservation professionals. Because of chang-
ing valuations and norms, Hutter and Rizzo (1977)
propose to think of cultural heritage as a nomadic
term.4
The nomadic character of the definition of c u l-
t u ral heritage accounts for the deliberations and
conflicts that so often accompany its identifi c a t i o n ,
p re s e rvation, and exploitation. A good example of
nomadic character is the controve rsy that arose in
response to the planned construction of a high-rise
building on top of the Grand Central Station in
N ew York (see Costonis 1997). The authorities pre-
vented the construction on the grounds that the sta-
tion was a special site, part of the city’s cultural her-
itage, and would lose part of its value as such with
a building looming over it. The corp o rate owner of
the building argued that its property and deve l o p-
ment rights we re violated by the restriction. “As a
matter of basic fa i rn e s s, the ow n e rs wo n d e red why
t h ey, alone among contiguous site ow n e rs, should
h ave been singled out to provide the claimed publ i c
b e n e fits at seve re costs to themselves” (Costonis
1997:83). Economic values clashed with cultura l
o n e s.
Thus far, we have noted failures of markets to
provide public and merit goods and to live up to
norms of fairness. But even where markets may
work, they may be considered inap p r o p r i a t e .
Markets for babies might work, but in most coun-
tries they are outlawed on the grounds that trading
human beings is immoral. Likewise, love, truth, and
beauty are values that many societies prefer to gen-
erate outside market situations. Cultural heritage
might be judged to be of a similar kind.
VALUE OF CULTURAL HERITA G E
If markets fail to determine the value of heritage
goods, the value of cultural heritage has to be estab-
lished in another way. As economists will never tire
of pointing out, resources are limited, and choices
are inevitable. This certainly is the case when the
preservation of heritage goods is at issue. In order to
make rational choices, policy makers need to evalu-
ate altern a t ive uses of their scarce re s o u rc e s.
Economists have developed various techniques for
such an evaluation. As Frey (1997a) points out, the
intent is invariably the appraisal of the satisfaction
that actual or potential consumers derive from the
heritage goods (in accordance with the norm of con-
sumer sove reignty). Th u s, these economic tech-
niques are meant to deal with valuation and not val-
orization—to recall a distinction made earl i e r.
Valuation involves the assessment of values that
people actually attach to heritage goods, whereas
valorization is the (re)appraisal of the heritage goods
by means of deliberations, pleas by art historians,
debates in public media, and so forth. In the process
of valorization, people may learn the values of the
heritage goods (which economic studies may subse-
quently register in their valuation).
Frey and Pommerehne (1989) distinguish various
values that individuals may attach to heritage goods.
Option value is the (imaginary) satisfaction some-
one experiences of having the opportunity to use or
enjoy a particular piece of heritage. Existence value
amounts to the value contained in the enjoyment of
the mere existence of a heritage good—not of
enjoyment of its presence or actual use of it. The
bequest value is the value that future generations
derive from a heritage good, and the prestige value
is as its says: the prestige that a community or per-
son derives from having a particular heritage good.
Finally, the education value captures all benefits that
heritage generates in terms of education.
The basic technique for economic valuation is
cost-benefit analysis. The strategy here is to isolate
particular values; find some way to operationalize
their measurement by means of proxies, simulation,
or surveys; and, finally, to derive a value composite.
The measurement compels the reduction of com-
plex values to the common denominator of money.
The following sections discuss four different ana-
lytical tools used to measure the economic value of
heritage. Most of these tools were developed to
assess values vis-à-vis the natural environment. So-
called willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies and impact
studies try to measure the values that people reveal
in their actual behavior. Economists have a predilec-
tion for these studies (Diamond and Hausman
1992:6), but because in many cases there is no behav-
ior to observe, economists may take recourse to con-
ducting studies by asking people about hypothetical
situations; such methods are called contingent valu-
ation (CV) methods and direct re fe renda. Contingent
valuation studies are the most popular nowadays.
Willingness-to-Pay Studies
Although the concept of w i l l i n g n e s s - t o - p ay can
apply to the study of actual as well as hypothetical
behavior, we use it to denote the former use. The
obvious way people show their willingness-to-pay
for the heritage is through paying admission fees for
access to heritage. A problem emerges when no fee
is or can be charged. Thus, methods are needed to
measure these WTPs in a roundabout way. Cropper
and Oates (1992) distinguish three types of WTP
studies, summarized briefly below.5 Each is a distinct
way to measure the value that people implicitly
reveal for the heritage. People reveal their preference
for the heritage by their behavior when they turn
away from it (averting behavior) or through the pur-
chase of complementary goods (weak complemen-
tarity approach). In a third instance, the value of the
heritage shows through the prices that are paid for
other goods (hedonic pricing).
Because people usually do not have to pay the
full price (reflecting all costs) to enjoy a heritage
good, they do not reveal their (subjective) valuation
of that good. An indirect approach for registering
such a valuation is to determine the value of alter-
natives that people would turn to in case the her-
itage good were to cease to be accessible. People
could decide to go to an amusement park instead of
visiting a heritage site. The admission fee for the
amusement park is then a proxy for the subjective
value of the heritage site.
This approach is particularly useful for assessing
value losses, caused by deterioration, erosion, or
congestion. Otherwise, this method is only possible
in special circumstances. (The Chinese authorities
could, for instance, close the Great Wall in order to
study what visitors would do instead.)
If people do not pay directly for access to her-
itage, they at least pay indirectly when they want to
enjoy it. The amount people are willing to spend on
complementary goods is an approximation of the
value of the heritage good itself. Complementary
goods are goods that are consumed jointly or togeth-
er with the heritage. Most of these complementary
goods have to do with gaining access to the heritage.
Economists thus measure travel costs, the opportu-
nity costs of travel time, and other costs that people
incur in order to get to the site.6 For example,
Americans who want to view their Irish roots in
order to understand part of their cultural back-
ground spend a lot of resources to do so. These
expenditures are good proxies for the value they
attach to their heritage. Other complementary
goods are additional costs for food, the hiring of
guides, and the purchase of background readings.
These expenses may also include donations in sup-
port of that particular site and government subsidies
to which taxpayers agree (through their representa-
tives).
Hedonic pricing methods assume that one good
is a compound of a number of subgoods or attribut-
es. The price paid for the good then applies to the
total range of these different goods or attributes, but
it could, in principle, be split into prices for the vari-
ous attributes. If one purchases a historic building,
the price one pays is composed of a price for the
building and a price for its attributes, such as loca-
tion or the fact that it is listed.
Following the hedonic pricing method, one com-
pares the prices of buildings that are listed with
those that are not (and which do not differ with
regard to other attributes). The difference in price
then indicates the value people attach to the her-
itage. In case one wants to see whether people attach
a value to the cultural heritage in a particular city,
one could measure differences between the wages
paid for the same jobs (under the same conditions)
in another city. The difference then indicates how
much people are willing to expend for living in a city
where there is more cultural heritage.
Impact Studies
Impact studies measure the economic significance of
a heritage good, in terms of the income that it gen-
erates directly and indirectly (people who receive an
income thanks to the heritage good genera t e
income for others by spending theirs). Even though
these studies do not directly measure the (subjective)
value of heritage, they have been quite popular
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Box 1. Some economic impacts of restoration policy, Netherlands.
To get an impression of a specific type of impact study, consider the following example. A recent study
calculated various economic consequences of Dutch conservation policy. In the Netherlands, owners of
historic monuments can apply for government support grants for conservation. The following impacts
were calculated for 1997:
The multiplier of investments in the restoration of monuments amounts to 2.78: each dollar granted by
the government led to a total investment of $2.78. The other $1.78 comes from private investments, spon-
soring, or donations.
The so-called earn-back effect amounts to 0.74: of each dollar granted by the government, $0.74 returns
to the government in the form of taxes (income taxes of the labor involved and VAT on materials used).
Hence, the investment of $1 in the heritage costs the state only $0.26.
The macroeconomic effect tries to account for the impact of investments in monuments by looking at its
economy-wide (indirect) effects. It turned out that of each dollar invested, $1.10 is returned via tax
receipts.
The employment effect of the entire conservation policy equals 3,500 labor years per annum ($500,000 of
investment led to 9.25 labor years).
Of these results, the multiplier of investments and the employment effect seem to be the most reliable.
The flattering outcomes contained in the earn-back effect and the macroeconomic effect are more likely
to be the result of flaws in the impact studies.
Source: Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg 1998.
among policy makers and advocates of subsidies
during the last twenty years or so, because they
appear to indicate that expenditures on heritage
goods have economic returns (Box 1; see also, for
example, Vaughan 1984; Mye rscough 1988; va n
Puffelen 1987).
Measuring the direct impact is straightforward,
as all the investigator needs to do is add all income of
those who are directly employed in providing, con-
serving, and restoring the heritage good. Measuring
the indirect impact is more difficult. The researcher
needs input-output tables in order to determine the
derived incomes in the various sectors of the econo-
my. When the guards of a site consume lunch in an
adjacent pub, they generate income for the people
working in the pub. That income counts as an indi-
rect impact, and so does all the income generated in
the printing of flyers and posters to promote the site.
The impact of the spending of visitors to the site is
also indirect. Policy makers are instructed to pay
special attention to the so-called multiplier, which
the re s e a rcher calculates by dividing the total
income effect of the heritage good by the invest-
ment. It suggests that one dollar invested in the her-
itage good has a multiple impact on the economy. In
cultural projects, the multiplier usually turns out to
be around 1.2.
The interest in economic impact studies appears
to be waning, as the drawbacks become clearer.
While policy makers once chose these studies
because they were a solid alternative to the other-
wise qualitative justifications of subsidies for the
arts, they are now beginning to realize that: (1) the
economic impact of most cultural projects is quite
small, and (2) important qualitative criteria are left
out altogether. Critics point out, moreover, that the
studies tend to overestimate the economic impact,
since they usually leave out the negative effects of
cultural projects (traffic congestion, the loss of eco-
nomic value due to regulation) and, more impor-
tantly, they misstate the multiplier effect. As to the
latter critique, impact studies tell how much income
a dollar invested in a cultural project generates, but
they fail to mention that that dollar has to be with-
drawn from circulation first. Most likely, taxpayers
had to pay up, and so do not have that dollar to
spend. This points to a negative multiplier effect,
which may offset the positive multiplier effect that
the impact study shows. Moreover, there may be
alternative uses of that dollar (such as for schools)
that may have larger multipliers and hence generate
more income. 
The important conclusion is, therefore, that eco-
nomic arguments alone will not suffice to justify
subsidies for the arts (Klamer 1996; van Puffelen
1992).
Contingent Valuation Studies
Contingent valuation (CV) studies are curre n t ly
most in vogue among economists, although these
studies also have their critics. The technique of con-
tingent valuation owes much of its reputation to the
measurement of environmental losses in the disaster
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. The method
became the subject of extensive scrutiny, because
there was so much at stake during this process. The
method has improved considerably from guidelines
developed by an independent commission involved
in the Valdez controversy (Hausman 1993).
The basic method is that of a survey. A random
selection of a pertinent group of people is asked to
value a hypothetical situation. In economic studies,
this usually concerns a hypothetical good in a hypo-
thetical market. People may be asked about their
willingness to pay for that good (in so-called willing-
ness-to-pay studies)7 or, alternatively, their willing-
ness-to-accept (WTA) the abolition of a measure or
the removal of an object. In the WTA case, the study
tries to measure the amount people may need to be
compensated, for the (hypothetical) loss.
The quality of a CV analysis strongly depends on
the design of the survey. Because it is too easy to
spend hypothetical money in a hypothetical situa-
tion, the subjects need to be made aware of the alter-
native uses and therefore need to be made aware of
a great deal of i n fo rmation befo re they begi n
answering the questions. The survey should be suffi-
ciently rich and varied to allow for consistency
checks. To make up for the shortcomings of CV
studies, some researchers have used so-called verbal
protocol studies, in which they ask respondents to
think aloud while expressing their WTP. Another
option is to ask people to apply in practice what they
reveal in their answers—for example, to give to char-
ity the amount of money that they said they were
willing to spend.8
Even with such improvements in the method,
doubts linger. How truthful can people be when
they are confronted with hypothetical situations? A
conference devoted to the CV technique concluded
that CV studies do not measure actual preferences
and are therefore of little use in a cost-benefit analy-
sis (Hausman 1993 and especially Plott therein).
Frey (1997a) cites a number of problems with the
application of CV studies to the arts. First, CV stud-
ies allow only all-or-none choices, rather than con-
tinuous ones. Second, CV studies tend to neglect the
dynamics behind the provision of the heritage good
under consideration. Further, there is error built
into the selection of the people who are questioned.
These are usually local people, but appreciation of a
heritage good can be quite international. Besides,
they do not sufficiently account for the so-called
endowment effect, which is the extra value that peo-
ple attach to a piece that already belongs to the her-
itage versus a good that could become part of the
heritage (Frey and Pommerehne 1989:124).9 Finally,
CV studies cannot differentiate between a specific
cultural property, such as one specific country house
in the UK, and cultural heritage in general (all coun-
try houses). According to Frey, the main benefit of
CV studies is that they permit qualitative judgments
besides the quantitative judgments of economic
impact studies (Box 2).
Referenda
The shortcomings of economic-impact and CV
studies motivate the constitutional economist Bruno
Frey to advocate the referendum in addition to CV
studies (Frey 1997a:42). The referendum asks a con-
stituency to vote on a public expenditure for the arts
that they have indicated in the CV study to be worth-
while. This proposal therefore combines a study of
hypothetical and actual valuation. Objections to the
referendum idea are fairly obvious: uninformed citi -
zens, the power of propaganda, limited participa-
34
35
Box 2. Contingent valuation study of heritage in Mexico.
Contingent valuation studies are employed in many ways. One application is to measure the value of the
heritage per se. Contingent upon on one’s interests, the research may take many directions. One can
assess the value of one specific piece of heritage, or one can try to estimate the value of an entire body
of heritage (in a country, for instance). One can also differentiate between who values the heritage: its vis-
itors, neighboring communities, society, or even humankind in general.
Beltrán and Rojas (1996) performed a CV study to determine the value of three Mexican archaeological
sites (Templo Mayor, Cholula, and Cacaxtla), for both their visitors and for Mexican society. The first cat-
egory (visitors) concerns the consumption of the heritage; the second category (Mexican society) repre-
sents the value of preservation. Visitors to these sites now pay 13 new pesos (approximately $3.75).
During weekends, admission is free. At each site, three hundred questionnaires were filled out, half of
which were by paying visitors. Besides being questioned about a number of socioeconomic variables and
about visits to the heritage, people were asked how much they were willing to pay to visit the sites. The
following table shows the average willingness to pay in new pesos (which, on average, is higher than the
admission fee charged by the Mexican authorities):
Templo Mayor Cacaxtla Cholula
Nonpaying Paying Nonpaying Paying Nonpaying Paying
17.3 23.0 15.1 21.4 9.20 8.80
There are a number of interesting findings:
• Nonpaying visitors are willing to pay anyway.
• Paying for the heritage matters: paying visitors have a higher WTP than nonpaying visitors.
Moreover, paying visitors are also more disappointed when the site falls short (as was the case in 
Cholula).
• The quality of the site matters: consumption WTP differs from site to site.
• There is a high degree of differentiation: there are great differences among the WTP of individual 
visitors.
In order to determine the value for the preser vation of the country’s heritage, 5,600 questionnaires were
filled out in seven cities. Those questioned were asked how much they were willing to pay for the upkeep
of the archaeological zones on a monthly basis. These results are even more striking. Although there were
sharp differences among cities and among the people in those cities, Mexicans were willing to pay on a
monthly basis amounts that varied from 3.43 new pesos in Monterrey and 11.95 in Mexico City, to as
much as 16.50 in Puebla. These figures suggest that Mexicans care greatly for their heritage and are will -
ing to sacrifice some of their resources.
Despite the general orientation of the study, Beltrán and Rojas have clear policy implications in mind.
Given the limitations of governmental support, they conclude that their study indicates that people are
indeed willing to pay more, both for the sites they visit and for the heritage in general. The challenge is
to develop proper institutions in order to capitalize upon this willingness to pay. They recommend that
the management of the sites charge higher prices and devise price discrimination strategies. For the gen-
eral heritage policy, they suggest starting a national and international promotion and donation campaign.
Source: Beltrán and Rojas 1996. 
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tion, and cost. Frey points to positive experiences
with the method in his home country of S w i t ze rl a n d .
Valuing Cultural Heritage
To measure is to know: this is the motto of all eco-
nomic investigations into the valuation of cultural
heritage. “Without good knowledge and under-
standing of the costs and benefits of the use of a par-
ticular object belonging to cultural heritage, opti-
mizing the use of cultural heritage by selecting the
mechanism or the institutional arrangement that
entails the smallest difference to the welfare maxi-
mum must remain futile and meaningless” (Koboldt
1997:67).
Yet, in the absence of we l l - functioning and
morally justifiable markets, measurement remains a
tricky business. Economists, therefore, cannot pro-
vide the final word. And even if economists could
have that final word, culturalists would feel that they
were left out and that their values were excluded-
and justifiably so, for none of these economic mea-
surements takes into account their valorization of
goods as cultural heritage goods. Hence some quali-
fication is needed: decisions about heritage conser-
vation can benefit from economic measurements,
but one should keep in mind that they are only one
tool among others.
WHO PAYS, WHO BENEFITS, AND 
WHO CARES?
When Markets Fail
As mentioned above, the economic approach is
about making choices and evaluating them in terms
of costs and benefits. Good markets do the job, but
when they fail, economists have a job to do. In effi-
cient markets, those who pay for a good are the same
as those who enjoy the benefits of that good. And that
means that the ve ry same people are those who care
about the good. Economists genera l ly pre fer such out-
comes: they seem fa i r, and they seem to guarantee the
proper incentives all around. Market fa i l u re might
result in an uncoupling of these identifi c a t i o n s. In case
o f a subsidy, taxpaye rs pay in the end, but they may
not benefit. And among those who benefit may be
m a ny who did not care enough to orga n i ze the sub-
s i d y. In that case, the economists again have a job to
d o. Th ey consider it their task to study the effects of
nonmarket interve n t i o n s, how they affect incentive s,
h ow fair and efficient they are, and, possibly, wh e t h e r
superior altern a t ives are conceiva bl e.
Critical in many studies is the issue of property
rights. When regulations enforce the preservation of
cultural heritage, property owners incur costs while
everybody else is free to enjoy. Owners of heritage
property may invest a lot of care and costs in their
property, but instead of an increase in value, they
may be confronted with a decrease in the value of
their buildings due to the listing. Box 3 addresses this
type of case.
Rent Seeking
Economists are also concerned with the incentives
of those who supposedly care. The standard argu-
ment points at the superior incentives and knowl-
edge that people in markets tend to have. People
who use their own money act in their own interest.
Since government bureaucrats—or, for that matter,
employees of international agencies—work with the
money of others, economists become suspicious.
Maybe regulations are in their interest, economists
wonder, because by means of regulation they are in
control—and they need to have control to have a
job. Maybe they fight hard to increase their budget
for subsidies because the distribution, too, gives
them work and perhaps prestige. According to econ-
omist Sir Alan Peacock, art administrators “delude
themselves into believing that they are perpetually
u n d e r funded’’ and “conduct continuous action
designed to re m ove the constraint” (Pe a c o c k
1997:227). The underlying force is that of rent seek-
ing; that is, the attempt to appropriate surplus value
(rent in the broad sense) in excess of what would
otherwise emerge on a perfect market. Think of cul-
tural organizations lobbying for additional subsidies
or for better regulations, or of government bureau-
crats devising new subsidy programs as a way to
i n c rease their powe r. Benhamou (1996) pre s e n t s
empirical evidence from France that suggests that
these forces operate in the sphere of the govern-
ment. She registers an exponential rise in conserva-
tion costs, just as economists would expect (Box 4).
Who Cares?
And then there is the question of who cares enough
to take responsibility for organizing and financing
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Box 3. Effects of listing.
Heritage policies generally deal more with regulation than with direct funding. But each regulation has
economic consequences. Owners of listed paintings, for example, may have difficulties selling at a good
market price because of restrictions on export of listed paintings. When the listed heritage is immovable,
the owner will be restricted in the usage of the building and may incur additional costs for preservation
of the structure in its original state. Conversely, listing may add value to the property because of the
recognition it receives as a consequence of the listing. There is no way of telling in advance which effect
will dominate in the end.
England’s Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) recently conducted a study to assess the effects
of listing on the value of property (1994). In earlier research they had established that the financial per-
formance of buildings is not affected by listing. In the 1994 study, however, they found that listing reduces
the capital value of buildings. This result, however, should be interpreted with great caution and cannot
be taken as proof that listing always leads to a decrease in value. The study includes only cases in which
the owners applied to the authorities for demolition or alteration and had their applications turned down.
This sampling strategy was chosen because it enabled a measurement of value changes. The selection of
cases, hence, implies a bias toward negative value effects. Buildings with increased value due to listing are
left out.
Despite this major flaw, the study provides useful empirical insights. The study shows, for example, how
owners are unable to internalize the externalities of heritage buildings due to market failure. Owners
were shown to suffer from a value decrease of between 1% and 10% of a building’s value. Listing pre-
sented a number of restrictions that negatively affected the value of the building:
• Listing eliminated development value: owners could not tear down a building and construct a more
profitable one.
• Listing resulted in uncertainty: owners were unclear about which alterations were permitted, and
they faced unpredictable application procedures.
One insight drawn from this is that listed buildings are part of the lower segment of the market, because
they have a less efficient cost structure. As a consequence, they are subject to vacancies, especially in times
of excess supply of office space. If suitable use is not found, they are liable to deterioration. This is even
more likely to be the case in places such as England, where listing does not invoke a duty to keep build-
ings in good repair. Of the eleven cases in the study in which alterations or demolition were refused, eight
are vacant, and six of them are deteriorating.
Another remarkable finding is that in a number of cases, developers used resources from other parts of
their portfolio to subsidize the listed buildings. Developers considered this to be a nice gesture made on
behalf of society at large.
The irony here is that listing does not necessarily help solve the problem of conserving cultural heritage.
Buildings were kept from demolition, but because listing failed to take financing into account, they were
not protected against deterioration. The study appears to suggest that some form of compensation for
owners’ lost value is desirable. Leaving aside the question of who is to pay this compensation, we may
wonder whether compensation will provide the proper incentives. Will owners be able to attract proper
renters for longer periods? Another solution is to be more flexible and allow alternative uses for the build-
ing. Or perhaps the listing of large buildings should be abandoned altogether (see Box 4).
Source: Scanlon, Edge, and Willmott 1994.
38
Box 4. Public expenditure on listed heritage: slippery slopes and spirals.
Besides costs for the private sector, listing also has economic consequences for the public sector. Françoise
Benhamou has performed a study in France in which she investigates the consequences of listing for pub-
lic-sector expenditure on the heritage. In France, central authorities finance about 50% of conservation
work on listed buildings. Heritage regulation also offers indirect support in the form of tax deductions for
repairs and caretakers, and relief from inheritance taxes. Apart from this support, a large part of the her-
itage is owned by the government (5.6% state, 62.5% local authorities). The total amount of buildings list-
ed is approximately 15,000.
Consequently, the costs of listing policy are considerable and tend to grow constantly. Two factors are the
s o u rce of this gr owth. First, lists develop cumu l a t ive ly—that is, more and more buildings are accepted, and
o f c o u rse none are taken away. Second, the concept of heritage has continu a l ly undergone extension: eve r
m o re types of goods qualify as heritage. The concept of heritage fi rst encompassed buildings; later it has
been expanded to include ga rd e n s, interiors, and industrial heritage. Developments in listing are as fo l l ow s :
As expected, the costs are considerable; Benhamou calculates them at $1.6 billion, which will (if one takes
in account multiplier effects, as mentioned in Box 1) result in a total of $4.0 billion spent on heritage. Since
the state is finally responsible for these costs, expenses are likely to grow.
In order to see how this develops, Benhamou presents an argument somewhat Malthusian in spirit. The
growth rate of the number of monuments is larger than the growth rate of the GDP, and hence, the
growth rate of governmental expenditure is bound to grow without bounds. As a consequence, “In a sta-
ble economy, if the division between salaries and profits remains unchanged, the share of wages which is
paid to employees who maintain and restore the historic monuments represents a growing fraction of the
national income. Then the permanent upkeep of a growing number of historic monuments will result in
the annual earm a r king of an increasing proportion of national income” (Benhamou 1996: 121).
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Benhamou has noted yet another mechanism at play in the funding demands of listing: spiraling spend-
ing (Benhamou 1997). This phenomenon is a consequence of asymmetric information. Owners of his-
toric buildings first of all want to preserve their property and prefer to g ive it the best possible treatment
(either for reasons of enhancing its economic value or its cultural or aesthetic values). Conservators also
want to have the best (both in qualitative or quantitative terms). In order to secure as much government
funding as possible, they make increasing demands on public funds. Because the administration does not
possess the right information to curtail these demands, the demand on funds spirals upward.
In both ways, Benhamou describes a kind of heritage version of Baumol’s cost disease. Just as Baumol
argued for the performing arts, serious productivity growth in the conservation sector is not to be expect-
ed, since work is largely artisanal in nature. Moreover, authentic materials become ever more costly.
Benhamou suggests three solutions to counteract the increasing demands on public funds for the her-
itage. These are:
• Sponsorship: the burden for the upkeep of the heritage should not fall on the state alone but could 
also be carried partly by the private sector.
• Merchandizing: some goods related to heritage can be marketed at a commercial rate.
• Delisting: by removing items from the list, the costs of cumulative upkeep may decrease.
The first two solutions point to ways of financing public goods besides government financing. The third
solution, delisting, is uncommon in the field of heritage management, but this possibility challenges offi-
cials to rethink the rationales for listing. Decisions about listing (and thus delisting, too) are in general left
to experts, who are inclined to separate the issue of listing from that of financing the listed property. The
investigations of Benhamou suggest that there may be a relationship between the two. This point will be
picked up in the second part of this paper.
Sources: Benhamou 1996, 1997.
the provision of public goods like cultural heritage.
Many people care—in principle, they are all poten-
tial beneficiaries—but nobody may care enough to
take responsibility. That is why in economic discus-
sions about cultural heritage, the gove rn m e n t
almost automatically (after the identification of
market failure) assumes the role of the caretaker.
Accordingly, civil servants are assigned the responsi -
bility to design government programs, politicians
are left with the task to secure government budgets
for cultural heritage, and bureaucrats subsequently
spend the budgets.
However, public administrations are not neces-
sarily the only organizations that care enough to
take responsibility. The international agency Unesco
is the paradigmatic case. With its care for the her-
itage, it fills the international vacuum by making
conventions between countries and by prompting
research and exchange. And there are numerous pri-
vate nonprofit organizations that take responsibili-
ties for some heritage good or another, such as the
National Trust in the United Kingdom and the
National Trust for Historic Pre s e rvation in the
United States. Firms sponsor such organizations,
and numerous individuals contribute or volunteer.
Individual owners invest in their own property and
may also donate their heritage goods to semipublic
institutions like museums.
Throsby doubts that the market, combined with
voluntary and nonprofit action, suffices to care for
cultural heritage, although he recognizes the impor-
tant role that voluntary action has historically played
in terms of setting the agenda and providing funds
(Throsby 1997a:18). According to Throsby, the state
is the only agent with extensive powers, such as tax-
ing, government expenditure, and regulatory facili-
ties, to create the momentum needed for heritage
p re s e rvation projects. As noted above, howeve r,
Benhamou (1996, 1997) suggests that government
involvement may generate a dynamic that will be its
own undoing.
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
Like Throsby, economists customarily look to gov-
ernment when it comes to solutions to market fail-
ure for heritage goods, or even to the total absence
of a market. Laymen may immediately think of gov-
ernment spending, but there are alternative forms of
government intervention as well. A recent book edit-
ed by Schuster, Monchaux, and Riley (1997) surveys
the various options of government. The book iden-
tifies five tools for government to use for heritage
policy: direct ownership, regulation, changing incen-
tives, modifying property rights, and providing infor-
mation. A brief discussion of each one follows.
Direct Intervention: Owning or Operating
Heritage
In order to preserve certain heritage goods, the gov-
ernment can simply take possession of them. This
practice is the most obvious way to circumvent the
market altogether. The message is clear: the appro-
priated heritage good serves a public interest, and
the government takes responsibility on behalf of its
citizens.
One question that economists ask concerns the
efficiency of such an intervention. Could the gov-
ernment have made better use of the taxpayers’
money (by spending on education or infrastructure)?
Might nongovernmental agencies be better caretak-
ers? Is it possible that the government’s appropria-
tion prevents other parties from taking possession of
the good? Economists are reassured when the gov-
ernment turns out to have acted as a last resort—
that is, as a safety net. But how can we be sure?
Nevertheless, there may be good reasons for the
government to take possession. The government
may have knowledge that other parties do not have.
Preservation and conservation can be expensive and
complicated affairs that require a great deal of exper-
tise, and government agencies may be better places
for the expertise that is required. Government agen-
cies may be best suited to deal with the coordination
problems that the preservation of important her-
itage goods requires. Often, parties interested in a
heritage project will stand back for someone to take
the lead. Government agencies may do just that.
Finally, state control over the preservation of her-
itage may be prompted by equity considerations.
The state can promote equity by devising uniform
treatment for everyone. This can help to mitigate
elitism and discrimination on the basis of class.
Attitudes toward government ownership differ
from country to country. Governments in western
Europe are more willing to intervene and can afford
to be so (although there are clear differences in poli-
cies between the Angl o - S a xon countries and
Continental Europe). In the former Communist
countries, heritage used to be totally under the con-
trol of the state. Following the collapse of state
socialism, these governments are underfunded and
badly organized, and they are therefore currently
not very involved in direct interventions. Generally
speaking, it is likely that in most developing coun-
tries, governments prefer to allocate funds to inno-
vate and develop for the future rather than to pre-
serve the past (Bianca 1997).
Regulation
Another form of government intervention is the
design of reg u l a t i o n s. In this case gove rn m e n t
claims authority and imposes its prescriptions and
norms on the parties involved. Throsby (1997b) dis-
tinguishes between “hard” and “soft” regulations.
Hard regulation prescribes behavior, whereas soft
regulation only steers intentions through con-
venants and treaties.
Throsby offers a number of arguments to justify
the use of regulation. These arguments reflect the
various functions of government intervention: safe-
ty net, expert, authority, coordinating entity, the
insurer of equity. Governments may act as safety
nets when the risk of a project is too high for private
parties, when other options are exhausted, or when
a cultural good is about to be irretrievably lost.
Regulation can take many fo rm s. The most
important ones are legal. There are regulations for
listing objects (only certain objects can enter the
list), for the consequences of being listed (only cer-
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Table 2. Direct and indirect incentives.
Direct Indirect
Individuals Grants Taxes (deductions or exemptions)
Loans
Guarantees
Exemption of regulations
(Nonprofit) Organizations (Matching) grants Taxes
Donations Loans
Guarantees
Exemption of regulations
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tain kinds of alterations are allowed), and for the use
of objects (they should be accessible to the public).
Other regulations concern the functioning of the
market (restricting the sale or export of certain
objects) or are concerned with taxation and subsi-
dies. Tax deductions (owners of historical buildings
can deduct restoration costs), tax exemptions (own-
ers of historical buildings do not have to pay proper-
ty or wealth taxes), or specific tax arrangements
(owners of historical buildings do not have to pay
taxes over the market value of property) are com-
monly used.10 Various regimes of subsidy regulation
may also apply. Owners may be eligible for subsidies
for conservation, operation, or the opening of
objects to the public.
Incentives
Incentives are the third kind of tool for the conser-
vation of heritage. In contrast to direct intervention
and regulation, incentives allow the state to stay out
of the actual process of conservation. They no
longer engage in hands-on work but provide incen-
tives to shape decisions. The message it expresses is
more cooperative—that is, when an individual per-
forms a particular action, the state will do its share.
As such, the state matches individual behavior and
hopes that incentives radiate from these matches.
Schuster describes two types of incentives: direct
and indirect. Incentives can be distinguished by
whether they are directed to individuals or (non-
profit) organizations. Various incentives are present-
ed in Table 2 (for examples, see Schuster, Monchaux,
and Riley 1997).
Unlike the first two tools, incentives are much
more dif ficult to control. Schuster, Monchaux, and
Riley (1997), refers to Stipe, who has argued that the
effectiveness of incentives depends, among other
things, on the income of the targeted person. A
more significant problem is that when incentives are
in money terms, the monetary value may not corre-
spond with the so-called incentive value.
Furthermore, incentives are based on specific
behavioral assumptions, which are, of course, falli-
ble. In devising an incentive, one assumes that peo-
ple act in a particular way because of this or that rea-
son. If an incentive anticipates reasons on wrong
grounds, the incentive is likely to fail. One great
advantage of a policy directed at incentives is that it
is less oppressive and interventionist than the alter-
natives. One disadvantage is that even with the prop-
er incentives, proper care of heritage goods is not
guaranteed. Control is limited at best.
Redefinition of Property Rights
This tool is analogous to policy tools in the domain
of copyrights and patents. The central idea is that
(social) benefits that do not automatically flow back
to the producer of the good (a classic case of market
failure) may do so anyway if the producer or owner
is granted extra rights, such as patents or intellectu-
al property rights.
Heritage regulation usually places a restriction
on the owner of heritage goods. Such conditions
pose a problem for the “traditional conception of
property rights” (Costonis 1997). Owners of build-
ings expect to do what they please. Although her-
itage regulation does not infringe upon basic proper-
ty rights (one still is the rightful owner), it does con-
flict with some of the rights normally implied in the
property right. Hence, regulation does not affect the
property rights on listed land, buildings, or objects
directly, but it may prohibit the execution of the
right to develop something on the land, to modify
the facade of a building, or to sell a work of art.
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Conflicts of this type can be avoided by a re d e fi n-
ition of t raditional property rights. Re d e finition can
take the fo rm of splitting rights into property rights
and development rights, or by introducing a new
type of r i g h t — for example, a “facade easement.”
The next step is to create special markets wh e re these
s e p a rate rights can be tra n s fe rred. Heritage pre s e rva-
tion can now be implemented by the deve l o p m e n t
rights being bought up, by facade easements, or by
the right of resale. Another solution is to forbid tra d e
in particular rights. The latter idea, howeve r, is not
re a l ly a solution to the original probl e m .
If markets are perfect, it can be expected that fol-
lowing the separation of property rights from devel-
opment rights, the price of the property right will go
d own, and the price of the development right
(together with, for instance, modification rights) will
reflect the separate value of the heritage.
Although these solutions seem somewhat art i fi-
cial, the pre e m p t ive rights that some European gov-
e rnments have awa rded themselves can be seen as a
re a l - wo rld example. Under pre e m p t ive rights, the
g ove rnment has the right to be the fi rst to purchase a
piece of m ova ble heritage when it comes on the mar-
ket. Only after the gove rnment has decided not to
buy can it be sold to others. By introducing pre e m p-
t ive rights as a new right, the gove rnment limits prop-
e rty rights on mova ble heritage. The right of re s a l e
h a s, in effect, been detached from the property right.
Information
The role of information is perhaps the least appreci-
ated and most underestimated tool for preservation
(Schuster, Monchaux, and Riley 1997).11 Yet in some
cases, it may be the only tool available. Schuster
points at a number of possible reasons for the use of
the information tool:
• Disclosure: The tool is employed to reveal existing
knowledge to those who are unaware of its exis-
tence;
• D r awing attention: The tool is employed to
attract more attention for a topic;
• Involvement: The tool is employed to increase
efforts of others on the matter; this application
of the tool fits well with efforts to decrease
direct government involvement.
Information plays the following roles in the conser-
vation process:
• Identification and documentation: The phenome-
non of listing performs a number of tasks for the
identification and documentation of heritage;
• Validation: The act of listing also reinforces the
value of heritage;
• Recognition: Acknowledging the value of a piece
impels to action;
• Promotion: Once a heritage good is officially iden-
tified as such, it may get desirable attention;
• P re s e rvation and maintenance tech n i q u e : Th e
exchange of information may enhance the effi-
ciency of preservation;
• Coordination: Information enables the coordina-
tion of action in which many parties are
involved;
• Education: Information is the key in communi-
cating to people the importance and intricacies
of heritage conservation;
• Persuasion and exhortation: Information may also
be used for more ideological purposes.
The information tool has as a great advantage that it
is cheap in relation to direct ownership. Its disadvan-
tage is that its effects are hard to trace and deter-
mine.
Special Attention for Movable Heritage
The emphasis in economic research on cultural her-
itage is traditionally on immovable heritage. Among
the reasons may be that the provisioning of mov-
ables resembles ordinary market behavior and hence
does not seem to re q u i re special attention.
Immovable heritage gains its value, for the most
p a rt, outside regular market settings and hence
requires a special discussion.12 But what if we were
to include movable heritage?
The main issue here is trade. In the case of ordi-
nary economic goods, owners can offer them for
sale to the highest bidder, but policy makers may
want to restrict the trade in movable heritage goods
simply to preserve those goods for the sake of the
local community. When foreigners buy art from
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Tibet at a grand scale for good prices, many
Tibetans stand to benefit in the short run; in the
long run, they will have to live without their own
cultural heritage goods in their possession. For the
sake of Tibetan cultural heritage, gove rn m e n t s
m ay want to prohibit ex p o rts of Tibetan art .
Governments may furthermore claim their preemp-
tive rights to buy heritage goods when they are put
up for sale.
It remains to be seen whether these measures
serve the intended goals. Forte describes these mea-
sures as “neo-mercantilistic” and accuses authorities
of measuring with two different measures (Forte
1997). On the one hand, governments operate on
markets to obtain valuable heritage pieces, while on
the other hand, they restrain markets when pieces of
heritage are about to leave the country.
The problem is that in many cases, movable
works of art cannot be unequivocally assigned to
one specific country. Do Shakespeare manuscripts
belong exclusively to the United Kingdom? Must
Maya objects stay in Central America? To whom
belongs a Ve rmeer commissioned by Louis XV,
depicting the queen of Spain, painted during
Vermeer’s stay in Switzerland, and now hanging in
the Louvre? Given that art has always been a global
phenomenon and given that there are major
changes over the course of history, current nations
are not necessarily the most obvious matrices. Both
B e l gium and the Netherlands count Fl e m i s h
painters as their cultural progeny. Roman and Greek
culture are considered to be the roots of all of
Western society.
According to Forte, trade restrictions damage
the interests of civilians. By artificially confining the
flow of artworks to somewhat arbitrarily chosen
countries, heritage goods remain confined to small
groups and tend to stay in private collections. Forte’s
analysis is focused on the European Union, but it
could easily be applied elsewhere. Works of art that
are important to the heritage of all Europeans are
appropriated by specific countries. The solution pre-
sented by Forte is to induce European programs to
make access more adequate. He suggests:
• joint ownership of public-interest partners;
• joint ownership of public-interest partners and
the EU;
• exchange systems of works of art;
• EU loans to public-interest organizations; and
• support systems based on circulation.
While trade may hamper preservation, preserva-
tion activities may affect trade. The obvious example
is, of course, the imposition of trade restrictions;
more interesting, however, are the consequences of
listing on the trade in works of art. Although these
matters are difficult to ascertain unequivocally, the
listing of movable objects generally leads to a rise in
the value of the objects. Note that the effect of list-
ing on the movable heritage is the inverse of what
one commonly thinks is the effect of listing on
immovable heritage. As the research discussed in
Box 3 suggests, the listing of buildings is expected to
lower their values rather than raise them.
There are two main reasons for this. There is
generally an active trade in movable heritage goods
themselves, rather than in some derivative or anoth-
er (as is the case with immovables). In addition,
agents of the arts may get directly involved in auc-
tions, and as a consequence, they may drive up
prices.
The upwa rd pre s s u re on prices and trade in listed
heritage has two side effe c t s. The fi rst is the emer-
gence of a l t e rn a t ive markets. In a historic study of
c o n s e rvation policy in Italy during the nineteenth
c e n t u ry, Guerzoni found a “double effect” of l i s t i n g .
In response to pre s e rvation measure s, new markets
e m e rged which took “advantage of g e ographical and
juridical inconsistencies by favoring or curbing their
a c t ivities in specific economic sectors connected to
the art market (restoring, painting and printing of
re p r o d u c t i o n s, the fo rg e ry industry, and so on)”
( G u e r zoni 1997:112). The second effect was the
e m e rgence of markets that focused on “collection-
a ble genres and market niches left uncove red by
p re s e rvation policies.” The most important effe c t
m ay be that people feel fo rced to shift their attention
from old masters to contempora ry work. Another
t e n d e n cy is the emergence of markets for looka l i k e s.
Listing procedures also influences artistic con-
ceptions. Listing sometimes leads to more listing.
Not only does consistency compel the extension of
lists, the spirit of listing may incite other forms of
listing. Thus, having listed works of Rembrandt
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compels one also to list works of Vermeer, and hav-
ing listed paintings urges one to list ceramics, books,
and sculptures too.
Yet another phenomenon concerns the strictness
o f t rade re s t r i c t i o n s. Strict regulations tend to
enforce a shift in where trade takes place. If regula-
tions are stricter in one region than in another, trade
u s u a l ly moves to the more favo ra ble regi o n .
Another outcome is that trade restrictions promote
illegal trade on black markets. Scotland Yard has esti-
mated that the annual value of stolen art amounts to
$460 million for the United Kingdom. Global thefts
(excluding looting) are ten times higher (Palmer
1995). A related problem is that strict regulations are
costly to enforce. Perhaps in modern society, the fear
of pushing heritage pieces onto the black market is
less pressing—after all, there are still great numbers
of cultural treasures from earlier times that are in
circulation throughout the world. These objects
have left their countries during wars or periods of
colonization, or they were removed by theft. In
many countries, regulation has been enacted to
enforce the return of these cultural treasures.
CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As the preceding discussion has shown, the science
of economics has important contributions to make
to the understanding of cultural heritage and con-
servation.
Leave it to economists to point out that scarcity
matters. Resources are limited, and hence, choices
are inevitable. Even though economists in general
prefer that markets deal with the scarcity problem—
on the grounds that they best guarantee consumer
sovereignty and the connection between those who
pay and those who benefit—they recognize that
markets are somewhat inadequate in the case of her-
itage goods. The main reason for this is the public
nature of heritage goods, although we should add
that the publicness of heritage goods has not been
the subject of serious inquiry. It is here that the
inventiveness of economic science can make a con-
tribution, and it is here, also, that economists have
something to learn from culturalists.
Economists point out various ways of procuring
public goods such as heritage goods. They all, in
some way or another, involve a government author-
ity. Governments can, for example, take possession
of the good and take care of its preservation and
availability to the public. Alternatively, they can pro-
vide subsidies to the (private) owner in order to safe-
guard the procurement of a heritage good. The
authorities may furthermore regulate owners of
heritage goods to prevent negligence or unautho-
rized changes to the good (including its export to
other countries), and they may try to improve the
incentives of owners and other interested parties to
do the right thing (for example, by alteration of tax
rules). Expect economists to be especially keen on
the latter issue. Incentives matter and play a major
role in economists’ analyses, so they want to know
the effects of any measure taken on the incentives of
owners and those who happen to care about a par-
ticular heritage good.
No matter how important these contributions of
economic discourse may be, the current state of
economic research on cultural heritage is less than
ove r whelming. Ta n gi ble results are limited. We
think that we have covered the important studies in
this paper and yet are left wondering about the
attention those studies have attracted either from
economists or others working with cultural her-
itage. Is the reason for the lack of interest among
economists that the applied research is too difficult
to do and does not stir theoretical interests? And do
practitioners ignore the research because the design
does not meet their needs?
Bruno Frey, an economist himself, attributes the
lack of interest of practitioners to the sobering effect
of much economic research:
The real problem is how to communicate this
fact [that contingent valuation studies are able to
distinguish in terms of the quality of work and
not in terms of general quantities] to the arts
people. They do not seem to be much interested
in willingness-to-pay studies but rely on impact
studies because they tend to yield much higher
absolute monetary values. Art economists right-
ly criticize impact studies which totally neglect
non use values, but arts people in this particular
case give up their resistance against the “moneti-
zation of art,” an attitude which they otherwise
cherish clearly. (Frey 1997a:41)
Another possibility for the lack of interest is that
economic research tends to be too restrictive. Its
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strategy requires the reduction of all values that
people may ascribe to heritage goods (like personal
value, use value, religious value, and cultural-histor-
ical values) to the only value that a quantitative
approach can handle—that is, price. This fixation
may be responsible for the alienation of those whom
we call culturalists. In fact, we doubt that culturalists
will recognize many of their concerns in the preced-
ing discussion.
The gap between the practices of economists
and those of culturalists is our concern. Is it possible
to bridge this gap? The next part proposes a possible
bridge. 
We end with a few questions and issues elicited
by this survey of the economics of heritage:
• In what respects are heritage goods different from
other goods?
Economists are inclined to treat heritage goods
as different because of their public character, a
notion that has drawn on research into the eco-
nomics of the natural environment. Are there
reasons to question this point of departure and
claim a different status for heritage goods?
• How “public” are heritage goods?
Does the public nature of heritage goods differ
from one kind of heritage good to another? For
example, are there significant diffe re n c e s
between the public character of a painting, of a
monument, and of a play? What are these differ-
ences? Does the public-good character of her-
itage automatically qualify it for government
support? Or are other financial arrangements
conceivable?
• Can market failures in the case of heritage goods be
normative?
Economists are inclined to focus on “objective”
reasons for market failure. As we discussed, mar-
kets may also fail for normative reasons in the
sense that people disapprove of market alloca-
tion of heritage goods. How can economics
accommodate such a disapproval?
• Who benefits, who pays, who cares?
When markets fail, there is no automatic coordi-
nation of caring, paying, and benefiting, accord-
ing to economist discourse. Is it true that the
market is superior to other arrangements, or
does it have a bias of its own? What are the rents
that the various stakeholders are after? Are they
always economic in nature? Which arrangement
suits which stakeholder best? What are the best
ways to link those who benefit, those who pay,
and those who care?
• What about the institutional solutions that econo-
mists propose?
The five economic tools (direct intervention, reg-
ulation, incentive s, re d e finition of p r o p e rt y
rights, and information) presuppose the involve-
ment of governments. Can these solutions also
be obtained by other means? What advantages
and disadvantages would be incurred?
• What has been the value of economic research into
cultural heritage so far?
Has economic research made a difference in the
heritage field? What are the main contributions
to the field that economics has made? Concepts?
Impact or value studies? How do we appraise its
main contributions?
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Part II: Financial Arrangements Matter
The first part of this paper ended with the conclu-
sion that although analytically powerful and helpful
for the identification of market failures, the mea-
surement of existing values (valuation), the signal-
ing of distributional issues, and the evaluation of
heritage policy and management, economic dis-
course falls short in accommodating the value dis-
cussions that are of greatest interest to culturalists.
This shortcoming does not justify, however, the
absence of economic concepts and insights in dis-
cussions among cultura l i s t s. The scarcity of
resources and incentives matter, as do social and cul-
tural, as well as economic, issues. Is it possible to
extend the discussion on both sides in order to find
common ground?
In Part II we articulate and support the thesis
that financial arrangements matter. The way in
which the heritage is funded may not only affect the
appraisal of the heritage but may even contribute to
the “creation” of the heritage. To put it in terms
used at an earlier GCI meeting, we want to see what
role economic arrangements play in the valorization
of the heritage. If there is such a role, we have found
a moment in which the (economic) process of valu-
ation interacts with the (cultural) process of val-
orization.
This is not to claim that economic factors play an
exclusive role in the valorization of heritage, as
some economic arguments unfortunately suggest.
Economic factors shape heritage creation and con-
servation, just like discussions among art historians,
conservation specialists, policy makers, museums,
tourists, and the media do. Surely, this recognition
complicates the analysis of the value of the heritage.
Then again, the subject of cultural heritage is com-
plex, as culturalists often point out. Many different
values come into play, and they are all continually
contested. We do not pretend that we are able to
incorporate everything. We focus on the role of eco-
nomic practices because we are, after all, econo-
mists. At the same time, we want to account for the
complexity of the value of cultural heritage.
The ideas that we present here are part of an
extended research program in cultural and socioeco-
nomics (cf. Granovetter 1985; Polanyi and Pearson
1977; Hutter and Rizzo 1997; Frey 1997b; Klamer
1996, 1997). As products of ongoing research, the
arguments are tentative and will need to be fleshed
out.
Specific values are constructed, or come about,
through certain processes. Think of a cupboard that
is old, decrepit, and dysfunctional, and that stands in
the way. You, the owner, are about to throw it out
when an acquaintance walks in who happens to be
an antique dealer. This acquaintance identifies the
style of the cupboard, surmises that it is from a well-
known nineteenth-century carpenter shop (how the
fame of the shop survived over time must be a story
in itself), and estimates the market price in the cup-
board’s current state to be around $7,000. Suddenly
the worthless cupboard has become valuable, and it
becomes so in many different ways. Learning about
the “objective” exchange value, or economic value,
you may change your opinion about the chest. You
may appreciate it now as antique; you may want to
learn more about that famous carpenter shop to
learn to appreciate the cupboard even more. You
may grow attached to the cupboard and use it as a
showcase for visitors—with a nice story added about
your initial ignorance. Who knows—the cupboard
may become your personal link to history.
The preceding sequence of events demonstrates
how a valuation in the market can trigger a process
o f valorization in which (noneconomic) va l u e s
come about. The sequence also works in the oppo-
site direction: When art historians, after some wran-
gling, have identified an old cupboard as being from
a famous nineteenth-century carpenter shop, expect
its “objective” exchange value to shoot up. Or when
it was determined that the painting Man with the
Golden Helmet was not by Rembrandt, its economic
value dropped dramatically. The process of valoriza-
tion, therefore, is to be expected to influence the val-
uation of a heritage good. These two processes are
inextricably linked.
If this interaction between valuation and val-
orization seems obvious, let us point out that it does
not show up in conventional economic accounts, as
reported in previous part. After all, valorization is
about a change in values, whereas conventional eco-
nomics presumes that the values people attach to
heritage goods are given. Accordingly, if we can
account for processes of valorization in the eco-
nomics of cultural heritage, we alter the standard
approach to accommodate the processes that figure
in culturalist accounts.
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Our intervention goes one step further, though,
suggesting that the way in which the economic value
of a good is realized may affect the valorization
process and hence alter its value. We contend that it
matters whether the heritage good is priced in a mar-
ket, subsidized by the government, or realized by
means of a gift. Pricing, subsidizing, and gift giving
are three ways of “financing” the good, and each
may influence the valorization differently—at least,
so we suggest. Figure 1 depicts the intera c t i o n
between valuing, financing, and valorizing.
Figure 1. Values and financial ar rangements matter.
If we are right in claiming that the financial
arrangement matters to the valorization of heritage
goods, culturalists will find a new interest in the
financial issues that they may otherwise have left to
economists. And economists will need to be con-
cerned with the substantive cultural consequences of
the financial ar rangements that they propose.
In the following pages, we elaborate on the three
different financial arrangements—pricing, subsidiz-
ing, and gift giving—in the case of heritage goods.
We will point out how they may affect the valoriza-
tion of the heritage. In Box 5, we present a few data
to attest to the empirical relevance of these financial
arrangements.
THREE ECONOMIC SPHERES
The three different financial arrangements of pric-
ing, subsidizing, and donating represent three differ-
ent economic sphere s. Pricing chara c t e r i zes the
sphere of the market. In this sphere, an exchange is a
quid pro quo: one value is exchanged for another
between parties, who have no other interest than
getting the best possible deal. Measurement in mon-
etary terms (i.e., price) is critical to enable an objec-
tive exchange of equivalent values for the so-called
exchange value. In markets, those who pay are usu-
ally those who benefit, and therefore they are also
those who care.
Subsidizing indicates a role of some government
player or another. Here those who pay are generally
not those who benefit—and usually not those who
care either. Taxpayers pay for the subsidies, and only
i n d i re c t ly, through their political re p re s e n t a t ive s,
have they a say on who benefits. Those who care are
politicians, and possibly bureaucrats and expert con-
sultants.
Donating is what people do in the so-called third ,
or info rmal sphere. Here people do not pay dire c t ly
for goods or services delive red, in a quid pro quo, nor
a re gove rnment agencies implementing rules and
l aw s. This sphere revo l ves around the gift—an info r-
mal exchange based on the principle of re c i p r o c i t y.
H e re, too, those who pay (the donors) are usually not
those who benefit; yet, in contrast to subsidizing
g ove rnment agencies, they are also those who care .
As Mauss and so many after him have pointed
out, the common gift is not disinterested (Mauss
1990). It is difficult to come up with examples of
gifts that do not carry with them the expectation of
a countergift. This is what is meant by the gift evok-
ing the principle of reciprocity. The critical differ-
ence with respect to the quid pro quo of market
t ransactions is the unspecified character of t h e
exchange. When an artist volunteers her own time
for making art, she may have no idea what the pay-
back is, and when parents give everything they can
to their beloved children, they may have no more
than an illusion that they may get some attention
and respect from these very same children when
t h ey gr ow old. When people donate time and
money to the National Trust, they may receive grat-
itude and good feelings in return, but the terms of
the trade are up in the air, highly uncertain, and cer-
tainly unspecified in any kind of contract. That is
why gifts are so different from market transactions
and government subsidies and why they are part of
an entirely different sphere.
The three spheres that we distinguish here cor-
respond with the three “forms of integration” that
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Box 5. Funding the heritage, United Kingdom.
The funding situation in the United Kingdom illustrates the need to distinguish the three dimensions of
the market, the government, and the gift. Although the state finances the greatest proportion of cultural
heritage conservation in the United Kingdom, the data show other, considerable sources (see Appendix
1). The National Trust, for example, is a nongovernmental organization with a budget that equals even
that of English Heritage.
The sources of funding for the important British organizations for cultural heritage are diverse. The fol-
lowing graph shows the relative contributions of the three dimensions—he market, the gift, and the gov-
ernment—to the funding of a selection of British heritage institutions.
The governmental distribution bodies, English Heritage, Historic Scotland, and the Welsh Office (Cadw),
are obviously largely dependent upon support from the government. Even so, the share of earned income
is still considerable. Remarkably, governmental organizations even receive some donations, in the form of
memberships.
The agency that manages the Historic Royal Palaces (HRPA) earns up to 75% of its income from admis-
sion fees and could be called a market organization. Still, a quarter of its income comes from government
support.
Voluntary organizations are a different story. In their case, income from membership constitutes the
largest portion of their funds, together with private donations and bequests. They, too, receive funds from
the government (these are likely to be distributed through English Heritage or Historic Scotland; hence,
some of the funds are counted doubly).
The data represented in the graph above suggest that the public nature of cultural heritage does not go
so far that only the government is able to care and put up the necessary funds for heritage conservation.
Market arrangements work, too, and there is another ef fective dimension—that of the gift.
Source: Casey, Dunlop, and Selwood 1996.
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Polanyi and Pearson (1977) identify, which are those
of exchange (our market sphere), redistribution (the
government), and reciprocity (the third sphere). The
third sphere figures prominently in the sociological
literature, as in the notions of civil society and
D u r k h e i m ’s mechanical solidarity. Conve n t i o n a l
economic discourse, however, does not recognize its
existence. Then again, it does not do much with gifts
either, even though these may figure in the great
majority of transactions among people—just think
o f the transactions among fa m i ly members or
between colleagues.
We distinguish the spheres by the type of trans-
actions that they enable. If one thinks in terms of
human interrelationships, both the market and the
government sphere tend to objectify interhuman
relationships. When “objective” prices and regula-
tions determine who gets what, social cap i t a l
appears to play a subsidiary role at best. When deal-
ing with a supplier, it is not who you know that mat-
ters but what price you are willing to pay. When
dealing with a bureaucrat, all that counts are your
objective data, which can be captured on a form and
compared to “objective” standards.
I n d ividuals as well as organizations usually oper-
ate in all three sphere s. We buy and sell in markets,
deal with gove rnments by paying taxes and re c e iv i n g
b e n e fi t s, and give to charities, our friends, and our
c h i l d ren. For instance, the data in Box 5 show that
British cultural heritage institutions generate their
funds in all three sphere s. Even gove rnment agencies
e n gage in the third sphere. An organization like the
Getty Trust may be associated fi rst of all with the
t h i rd sphere, as it re p resents one large gift, but it sure-
ly also operates in the market sphere (when “bu y i n g ”
labor and supplies) and will have a great deal to do
with the gove rnment. Then again, it may also oper-
ate more or less like a gove rnment agency, using
ex p e rts to determine which activities to subsidize .
Table 3 summarizes the main features of each
economic sphere.
It matters in which sphere the value of a good is
Table 3. Economic spheres.
Market Government Third spher e
Transfer Quid pro quo According to rules Reciprocity
and regulations
Closed Repeating Open ended
Organization Private Public Voluntary/nonprofit
Relation Objectified and Objectified and Personal
individualized individualized
Individual
Anonymous Anonymous Involved
Positi ve or Easy for dealing Generic application Accommodating
negative aspects with strangers
Autonomy Solidarity Engagement
Selfishness Distance Dependence, 
repression
Key values Prudence Common good Responsibility
Freedom Justice Love
Individual choice Engagement
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realized. Other values come into play. Following
economic sociologists like Granovetter (1985) and
economic anthropologists like Polanyi and Pearson
(1977), we posit that economic transactions are
embedded in the wider culture and society. A quid-
pro-quo deal is not just a deal but evokes the sphere
of the market—and hence the norms, expectations,
roles, and values that come with that sphere. Surely
that sphere is complex and allows a great variety of
experiences. Nevertheless, it is (more than any other
sphere) the sphere of freedom, individual choice,
innovation, selfishness, and prudence. It is not the
sphere where we expect expressions of charity, care,
solidarity, love, and friendship. It is the sphere where
we expect to run into characters like the merchant,
the dealer, and the entrepreneur.
To enter a transaction in the market sphere is not
a neutral act. It is not just that the transaction real-
izes the value of the good exchanged. It evokes
other values that pertain to this sphere, like free-
dom, self-interest, entrepreneurship. As historical
accounts show (cf. Thompson 1968; Reddy 1984),
the emergence of the market sphere caused a series
of tensions as values like loyalty, tradition, and the
just price clashed with the values of the market.
Even today, such tensions arise. Nobody will object
when producers of ice cream offer their product for
sale on the market, or when people offer their ser-
vices on the labor market, but selling children is
taboo (see Zelizer 1985) and so is selling one’s
organs or, in Europe, selling one’s blood.
Apparently, we judge the market sphere to be
inappropriate for certain goods. Think of friendship
or love. Pricing such goods can devalue them
(Klamer 1996). Put a price on love and it turns into
prostitution. Frey speaks in this case of a crowding-
out effect. But pricing can also increase the value of
a good, as in the case of our old cupboard. In Frey’s
terminology, this would be a crowding-in effect. The
point is that market transactions can be value laden
in and of themselves and thus affect the process of
valorization.
Government transactions are embedded in an
entirely different sphere. Here the main characters
are the bureaucrat, the civil servant, the politician.
Dominant values are solidarity, allegiance to the col-
lective, equity, democracy, national identity, and the
like. Engage with the government, and your conver-
sations will become quite different from those that
the market sphere engenders. The rhetoric, for one,
is different. In the government sphere, one is in need
of arguments that appeal to the principles of justice
or evoke the value of the collective (as national iden-
tity)—none of which arguments would be very per-
suasive to participants in the market. One also needs
to know how to play the bureaucratic game by tak-
ing its procedures ve ry seriously (Hutter 1996).
When the rules leave space for interpretation, lob-
bying key players in the political process is called for.
That, too, re q u i res special social and rhetorical
knowledge and skills.
Let entrepreneurial types talk about the govern-
ment sphere, and they will describe the difference
from the market sphere. Likewise, bureaucrats will
gladly reveal their qualms about entrepreneurial life,
thus attesting to its differences with their life.
The third sphere is again another matter. Th e
principle of reciprocity may re q u i re more pers o n a l
i nvo l vement than is necessary in the other two
s p h e re s. Transactions in this sphere demand inter-
p re t ive skills so that the nature of the reciprocity can
be known. (For instance, what can you expect from a
friend who is asking a big favor?) Gift tra n s a c t i o n s
evoke values like loya l t y, part n e rs h i p, friendship, and
re s p o n s i b i l i t y. Sure ly the conve rsations that surr o u n d
these transactions are, again, ve ry diffe rent from the
c o nve rsations engaged in by bu re a u c rats and self-
i n t e rested market part i c i p a n t s. In soliciting dona-
t i o n s, we may have to appeal to certain ideals or to
“higher” values than those re c og n i zed and identifi e d
by the other part y. We may make use of p e rs o n a l
connections and so appeal to loyalty or friendship.
Some goods lend themselves much better to this
sphere, whereas others are better transferred into
the other two spheres. Friendship is the obvious
example. To what extent artistic products or her-
itage goods are best valued in the third sphere
remains an open question. We would argue that
when values like connectedness, responsibility, and
identification are desirable, the third sphere is the
best option. If the choice of consumers is the domi-
nant concern, then the market would be the best
option. When a sense of solidarity or collectiveness
is at stake, the government sphere is perhaps best.
The third sphere appears to be pivotal in the “provi-
sioning” of social life. Just think of all the interac-
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tions among friends, fa m i ly members, and col-
leagues.13 A lot of art is produced and exchanged in
this sphere, as when partners or parents provide the
means to artists, or when artists themselves forsake
other opportunities for the sake of making art.
Among fellow academics, gifts are the common cur-
rency. Colleagues comment on our papers without
expecting payment. In fact, offering to pay for com-
ments would be absurd and suspect.
A common criticism that we receive regarding
this model is the generally positive description of the
three spheres. The description of the third sphere,
especially, runs into strenuous objections. The third
sphere would be suffocating for those who seek indi-
vidual freedom, some people object; it engenders a
sense of dependence, as in charity. We counter that
each of the spheres can devolve into excesses. The
market sphere can be ruthless and too objectifying;
the government sphere can be too bureaucratic and
anonymous. The third sphere can be the site of
repression, dependence, and charity in the negative
sense.
The point is not to opt for one sphere over
another but to judge in each instance which sphere
would be most pertinent. Pricing the heritage good
has consequences, but so does an application for
government subsidy or the solicitation of gifts.
M ATCHING VALUES AND FINANCIAL
A R R A N G E M E N T S
We return to the immediate issue at hand: the valu-
ation and valorization of cultural heritage. The pre-
ceding discussion defines the critical question as:
Which financial arrangement(s) is/are most appro-
priate for specific heritage goods? When are market-
type arrangements effective, and when are govern-
ment interventions called for? Surely, people in the
heritage field are used to asking these questions,
although we hope to have clarified that the answers
matter both to the economist and to the culturalist
sides of heritage conservation issues. This three-
spheres model, however, points at a real alterna-
tive—financing that pertains to the third sphere, as
through gifts and volunteers.
In case the reader is inclined to dismiss the last
option out-of-hand for being unrealistic, we present
some data that reveal significant activities in the
t h i rd s p h e re. Box 6 describes the situation in the
Netherlands and shows the relevance of the contri-
bution of voluntary labor to the cultural heritage
(see Appendix 2 for more information). This infor-
mation suggests that a major part of the valuation of
cultural heritage needs to be realized in the third
sphere. That is why we need to take the third sphere
into account when considering the values of cultural
heritage.
In terms of our framework, these data imply that
some combinations of values and financial arrange-
ments are more obvious and more unproblematic
than are others. Conversely, some combinations are
problematic or are simply unacceptable. Why do
churches with cultural treasures not charge a fee, as
the market sphere would dictate? Instead, they stay
within the third sphere by asking for alms or contri-
butions. The answer is likely that church authorities
consider market-type arrangements inap p r o p r i a t e
when it comes to entrance to the house of God.
The royal palaces in England, on the other hand,
charge a fee, and they can do so, as large numbers of
tourists are eager to visit them even at a price. Being
tourist attractions, they can apparently operate in the
market without compromising, in a serious way, val-
ues like national identity and accessibility to all citi-
zens. English Heritage has to rely on government
subsidies because so much of what it does, like
research, will not be financed in the market and
probably is difficult to finance by appealing to the
caring citizens. The National Trust does rely to a
great extent on gifts, and it can do so, since it can
offer its members (besides participation in a good
cause) access to heritage sites all over the country for
a reduced fee. Memberships do not make sense for
the royal palaces, however.
Apparently, particular values match best with one
financial arrangement or another. When national
identity is at stake, public funding or possibly dona-
tions may be called for—not a commercial form of
financing. Entrance fees for royal palaces signal their
tourist value more so than their value as symbols of
national identity.
Figure 2 (see page 53) gives an overview of possi-
ble combinations. The left side identifies values of
cultural heritage that we have found in culturalist dis-
course. The three spheres are on the right side. In the
middle is the “matching” box. How the matching
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Box 6. The importance of voluntary labor for the cultural heritage sector, Netherlands.
In 1994 a private consultancy firm explored the contribution of voluntary labor to the heritage sector in
the Netherlands. Voluntary labor proved to be substantial. The total amount of voluntary labor is as large
as 6% of total professional labor. The number of people engaged in it is more than half of the labor pop-
ulation, and it takes up to one-third of the population between 15 and 64 years of age.
Labor years Number of  people Average size of  job
Total labor population 5,300,000 6,300,000 0.84
Voluntary labor 300,000 3,370,000 0.08
A second finding is that voluntary labor is relatively more important for the heritage sector. The number
of volunteers is higher than the national average, and they spend (relatively speaking) more time on it.
Labor years Number of  people Average size of  job
Professionals 5,000 6,400 0.78
Voluntary labor 2,800 21,200 0.13
Heritage organizations usually explain the large share of voluntary labor by stating that their activities
would become unaffordable if they had to rely entirely on market arrangements. To see how big this
share would be, we use the wage equivalent of voluntary labor. For the sector of monuments, the wage
equivalent of voluntary labor is sometimes even larger than the wage sum paid to professionals:
Professional labor (in million $) Voluntary labor (in million $)
Museums 115 (73 %) 42 (27 %)
Monuments 18 (35 %) 33 (65 %)
Archaeology 6 (67 %) 3 (33 %)
Source: Vrijwilligerswerk in toerisme en cultureel erfgoed 1994.
occurs and when which match is optimal can only be
a subject of speculation right now. Further research
needs to focus on actual cases to determine patterns.
In the following section, we indicate a few factors
that research and case studies my want to take into
account.
HINTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Stakeholders
An analysis of a specific situation requires, first, that
interested parties be identified. Which parties care,
and which parties are willing to pay, or to pay a visit?
The parties directly and indirectly involved in financ-
ing a heritage good may be many, each with a differ-
ent stake in the good. Throsby provides a list of pos-
sible stakeholders (Throsby 1997a:24-25):
• Consumers: “those who enjoy some direct private
(excludable) benefit from the heritage item(s)
under consideration”;
• External beneficiaries: “those who enjoy some
beneficial externality or (nonexcludable) public-
good benefit from the item(s)”;
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Figure 2. Matching of values and funding.
• Supporters: “those who enjoy some direct cost
associated with the heritage item(s), for exam-
ple, through contributing personally to the cost
of upkeep, renovation, and so on”;
• Public support: “those who bear part of the cost
of upkeep, renovation, and so on, when that cost
is borne collectively—for example, through tax
expenditures”;
• Caretakers: “those who assume or are charged
with the responsibility of making decisions relat-
ing to particular heritage items or to cultural
heritage matters (such as heritage policy) more
generally.”
The list confirms an earlier remark that in the
provisioning of heritage goods, those who benefit
may be different people from those who pay—or,
again, different from those who care. From the per-
spective developed here, the list is not entirely satis-
factory. Economic motives prevail. In addition, we
might want to distinguish stakeholders on the basis
of the values they represent and propagate. So there
would be stakeholders who stand for national iden-
tity or for local identity. Conservationists or cultur-
alists who claim an intrinsic value for cultural her-
itage may be distinctive stakeholders as well. In gen-
eral, stakeholders stand for a particular connection
between heritage values and funding values—that is,
they embody a particular match. The National Trust
in England embodies culturalist-values-cum-recipro-
cal-values or, on other occasions, that of local iden-
tities and membership relations. A market arrange-
ment may benefit tourists and shop owners while
hurting those who stand for cultural values. When
we explore a particular financial arrangement, we
may want to investigate how it affects the relevant
stakeholders in that case.
Types of Goods
Another useful distinction to take into account con-
cerns the types of heritage goods involved. The
same physical object may turn into another good as
soon as its heritage value is recognized. The leaning
Tower of Pisa may first have been heralded for its
remarkable architecture and its contribution to the
local identity. It gradually changed into a national
symbol and an object for the tourist gaze. From a
local tower, it changed into a symbol and object of
satisfaction.
In standard economic accounts, heritage is seen
as either a private good (which can be sold on the
market) or as a public good (calling for governmen-
tal support). Although it is doubtful as to whether
this distinction holds up, it at least shows that there
is sometimes a firm connection between the way
goods are perceived and financial arrangements.
Once placed in a market setting, a heritage good
becomes like any other commercial good, and it will
be treated accordingly.
Types of Processes and Rhetoric
The three spheres represent three different process-
es; further research is needed to better characterize
and identify them. The market is essentially a decen-
tralized process. Although there are central loci
(marketplaces), the actions of people are not coordi-
nated in advance. When the market gets hold of a
heritage good, value generation will be a decentral-
ized process. Government processes are typically
centralized, in the sense that an authority or a
bureaucratic body cares and provides. Processes in
the third sphere will be mainly social and involve
extensive network relations.
These differences are reflected in the manner of
talking and communicating in each sphere—that is,
in their rhetoric. People in the market talk different-
ly from those operating in the third sphere or in the
government sphere. In the market, the talk is about
customer satisfaction, products, efficiency, manage-
ment, marketing, prices, profit, freedom, and entre-
p re n e u rs h i p. In the gove rnment sphere, other
notions dominate, like procedures, rules, regula-
tions, five-year plans, solidarity, national interest, jus-
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tice, equity, and control. For the third sphere, the
important terms are intrinsic motivation, values,
loyalty, responsibility, connections, doing and feeling
good, partners and friends, trustees, and volun-
teerism.
C O N C L U S I O N
Whether a cultural approach to economics will
bridge the gap between economic and culturalist
discourse remains to be seen. This paper at least
shows that values matter in an economic analysis of
cultural heritage, including the values that cultural-
ists highlight. In addition, the paper stresses the
importance of the particular financial arrangement
chosen. How a heritage project or good is financed
matters for the various stakeholders. The valuation
(an economic process) may affect the valorization (a
cultural process).
As the third sphere usually does not receive the
attention it deserves, further research should focus
on the effects of financial arrangements that bypass
the gove rnment and market sphere s. Especially
when the responsibility of stakeholders and their
identification with a heritage good are considered to
be important, gifts, contributions, and volunteer
work may be the superior financial arrangement.
Sensitivity for the many different values involved
and the possible financial arrangements is important
for a variety of reasons. It guarantees, for example, a
better understanding of the frictions and conflicts in
the field of cultural heritage. Furthermore, it broad-
ens the economic perspective on the value of cul-
tural heritage. This broader perspective may stimu-
late more specific and nuanced policies for the her-
itage and clarify the different financing arrange-
ments open to conservation advo c a t e s, thus
strengthening society’s capacity for valuing and con-
serving heritage.
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PUBLIC SECTOR £mln. $mln.
Department of National Heritage 191.7 314.1
English Heritage 104.4 170.0
Memberships and donations 3.6 5.9
Business 13.7 22.3
Total 121.7 198.2
Scottish Office 34.6 56.3
Historic Scotland 31.4 51.1
Income from properties 7.7 12.5
Total 39.1 63.6
Welsh Office 16.5 26.9
Cadw 15.2 24.8
Income from properties 2.7 4.4
Total 17.9 29.2
VOLUNTARY SECTOR
National Trust
Membership 41.8 68.1
Income from properties 52.7 85.8
Nonspecified (gifts, legacies, etc.) 33.1 53.9
Total 127.6 207.8
National Trust of Scotland
Membership 2.5 4.1
Income from properties 2.2 3.6
Gifts 22.2 36.2
Total 26.9 43.9
Source: Casey, Dunlop, and Selwood 1996.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Funding Organizations for Cultural Heritage, UK, 1994
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Voluntary Labor for Cultural Herita ge
In qualitative terms, the study on voluntary labor in the Netherlands’ heritage sector also provides a num-
ber of insights about the values behind the gift of voluntary labor:
• The development in the employment of vo l u n t a ry labor changes over the life cycle of an orga n i z a t i o n .
• The existence of different types of labor and the employment of voluntary labor. The most impor-
tant types of labor: visitor services, maintenance, and administration and management.
• The employment of voluntary labor is most successful when it takes the following form: when it is
project-based, when it has a local orientation, when it draws on affinity with personal interests, and
when it relies on entrepreneurial spirit.
The following motives for doing voluntary labor were mentioned:
• Larger museums: engagement with the museum or collection, social recognition, status.
• Smaller museums: personal collection interests, recognition as a collector, contact with like-minded
persons.
• Monuments: ideals, social recognition, status, concern for local history.
• Archaeology: recognition, labor skills for paid labor, meaningful leisure activity.
Organizational motives for employment of voluntary labor:
• Constitutive for activity: in some cases, the employment of volunteers is an integral part of the orga-
nization. For example, Friends of a museum or organization.
• Lack of resources: volunteers are employed because otherwise tasks could not be performed because
of a lack of resources.
• Price reduction: the employment of volunteers is motivated in order to charge lower prices. However,
cost structures and retail prices are often unconnected.
Consequences of the employment of voluntary labor:
• Differentiation of the good: the employment of voluntary labor leads to a differentiated type of
good. Tours given by a professional art historian differ from one by a local collector.
• Innovations: the employment of voluntary labor is likely to lead to the development of new types of
goods.
The employment of volunteers has a number of advantages:
• M o t iva t e d / e n gaged: vo l u n t e e rs are, in general, highly motivated and engaged with the matter.
• Flexible: volunteers are usually more flexibly employable.
Appendix 2: The Special Character of the Gift
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The employment of volunteers has a number of disadvantages:
• Non-obligatoriness: voluntary support cannot be enforced. Due to its voluntary character, it lacks
continuity.
• Lack of expertise and customer directedness: in some cases, volunteers have not been able to devel-
op sufficient expertise and attitude required for a number of tasks.
The simultaneous employment of voluntary and paid labor in one organization tends to develop a
dynamic in which paid labor drives out voluntary labor.
Types of organizations:
• Professional organizations employing volunteers: examples are larger museums.
• Voluntary organizations employing paid labor: example is the hiring of specialists or caretakers.
• Voluntary organizations run by volunteers: examples are smaller preser vation societies.
Source: Vrijwilligerswerk in toerisme en cultureel erfgoed 1994.
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1 To be more precise, policy makers actually constitute a third
type of player.  It suffices to see them as specific combina-
tions of the economist or culturalist characters. Although
their role is significant, for analytical purposes, we confine
our account to discussing only the first two.
2 For the same reason, we exclude a vast and growing litera-
ture on tourism and the heritage. Other sources are reports
on specific projects and policy studies. Apart from the fact
that these are less available, their scope is usually restricted
to the immediate (investment or conservation) goals they
are meant to serve. For a valuable overview in the British
context, see Allison et al. 1996.
3 An opportunity cost is the (imaginary) cost of not using
resources (tools, labor, or financial assets) for another pur-
pose. For instance, rather than investing money in a her-
itage project, there is an imaginary cost associated with the
alternative option of having put those resources in bonds to
earn economic interest instead. The forsaken opportunity is
an opportunity cost.
4 Hutter cites the art historian R. Samuel 1994 Theatres of
Memory, Vol. 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture,
London: Verso.
5 For more information on the subject, see P. Bohm 1979
Estimating demand for public goods: Why and how,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81:135–51. See also D.
Throsby 1984 Measure of willingness-to-pay for mixed
goods, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 46:279–89.
6 This has been done for recreation sites by Brown and
Mendelsohn 1984 The hedonic travel cost method, Review
of Economic Statistics 66:427–33.
7 Recall that the concept of willingness-to-pay can be used for
describing both actual behavior and behavior in hypotheti-
cal situations.
8 An interesting study in this respect is: Seip, Kalle, Strand,
and Jon 1991 Willingness-to-Pay for Environmental Goods in
Norway: A Contingent Valuation Study with Real Payment Oslo:
SAF Center for Applied Re s e a rch, Department of
Economics, University of Oslo.
9 Put in terms of CV studies the WTA of the removal of a
piece from the national patrimony is higher than the WTP
for a piece that is not yet part of the collection of a country.
10 For more information on special tax arrangements for cul -
tural heritage, see Netzer 1997.
11 The work of the GCI in general and of this conference in
particular is perhaps a notable exception to this point. See
also the Getty Art History Information Program 1996.
12 Another reason may be that the analytical framework of the
economics of cultural heritage was borrowed from envi-
ronmental economists. The immovable heritage has much
in common with the natural heritage. Since there is no
“natural” equivalent of the movable heritage, these matters
have undergone less development.
13 To see this, one only has to think of the numerous sectors
of economic life where production and distribution do not
take place along the measurable lines of the market or the
government. A thought experiment suffices to make this
clear. Imagine what it would cost if the following were to
be produced on a paid basis: household work (cooking,
cleaning, maintenance), care for a family (children, the
elderly, the sick), amateur sports clubs, music groups,
churches, neighborhood watches, social welfare, action and
pressure groups, councils, and so on.
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